There have been several large torpedo scandals in recent military history:
• German - with torpedoes with non-contact fuses of the “gray wolves” Doenitz;
• American - with a set of problems on the reliability of torpedoes in combat conditions of the US Navy submarines in World War II.
These problems cost Kriegsmarine too, and the US Navy, therefore, after the war, the U.S. Navy very tough approach to the creation of new torpedoes and their testing. In the context of the Cold War, threatened to become "hot", get dysfunctional torpedoes (and other means of submarine warfare) The US Navy categorically did not want to
Unfortunately, everything was much worse. Closing objective information on the experience of using torpedoes in Finnish, World War II and World War II led to, that we “did not notice” acute torpedo problems in their course at home and did not have an incentive for a similar US Navy, tough questions for industry according to the results and tests in the “torpedo” R&D.
US Navy submarine torpedo attack. Will there be something to answer and protect our submariners?
However, now our torpedo scandal has actually struck. And this gives hope for the dissection and elimination of the serious problems of our marine underwater weapons.
Released in the "military-industrial complex", NGOs, "Military Review" article (and their "resonant lighting" in the online edition of the "Ribbon") about the combat readiness of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet (never carried out torpedo fire under ice with operating homing systems) caused a violent reaction: in the media, society, Ministry of Defense and government (up to official requests: “Understand and report”).
Earlier, officials of the Ministry of Defense announced that, that "everything is in order", torpedo firing ("Combat training exercises") in the Arctic are “held”.
Even more surprising are statements about, that the forces of the Navy do not work out combat training exercises in the Arctic. probably, Klimov does not bother with the usual monitoring of news on this topic.
Quote g. Volosatova, Deputy Head of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense (MIC).
Admiral Evmenov, Commander of the Northern Fleet, has repeatedly declared "readiness for 100% completion of all tasks" in the Arctic:
Our submarines are constantly present under the ice of the Arctic. For obvious reasons, we will not go into the details of this work., but i can say, that ... the Northern Fleet has tremendous experience in ice navigation and the operation of submarines and surface ships in arctic conditions
... The main evaluation criterion is the readiness of the ships and their crews to perform tasks for their main purpose at sea. In, that today the North Sea submariners are ready to fulfill all the tasks 100%, I have no doubt ...
We also closely monitor the activities of our Arctic neighbors in this region.. We draw conclusions and based on them we improve our training.
Admiral Evmenov on 8 International Forum "Arctic". Photo redstar.ru
However, the indicated problem (the complete absence of torpedo firing of the Russian Navy in ice conditions) really exist, and statements by a number of persons about its alleged absence or related to the lack of objective information, or with her conscious concealment.
However, if the Department of IIMK (or other officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) have something to say, then as they say, listen carefully. Since the statement r. Volosatova (29 January) about the availability of “official news information on the development of combat training exercises in the Arctic” using the Russian Navy's practical torpedo weapons, they found no such information and presented it. AND It will take a long time to “search” for it - up to that moment, when such firing will finally be carried out. Given the resonance of this issue in society, and the military-political leadership is now only a matter of time.
Israeli army admitted the idea of a women's tank crews failed
There is a situation, when media publications and public outcry on the acute problem of the country's defense (the, what will happen, no doubt already) adoption of long overdue decisions - extremely important for the country's defense.
torpedoes. No technical issues. Problems are different
And here we can agree with the opinion of retired rear admiral V.Ya. Fudge (FAN expressed it on this issue) :
... until now, the firing necessary for this has indeed not been carried out, although Americans do it all the time. But such proposals have been prepared and, if necessary, can be implemented..
Yes, really, offers, mentioned by Rear Admiral Dudko, were prepared. Among the specialists, there are some discrepancies in their methodology., but it normal, subject to objective testing (“Consensus can only be in a cemetery”, and «the sea (test) will show, who is “to the right”).
obviously, that one of the key issues of our ice torpedo shooting is the development of a high-quality test methodology, their objective conduct. And here you don’t have to rely on people, earlier, stained themselves with questionable tricks with trials. "Whether the Navy received" ichthyosaurus "?
... a few years ago, the author of the article was asked the opinion about the “triumphant reports” about the “testing” of the equipment of the modernized USET-80 for the “stop target” - a torpedo short displacement with a “long” detection distance. However, a careful analysis of "relations" showed, that the “tests” were carried out in very small lake conditions, in the conditions of a "cold" surface layer (with the formation of an acoustic “channel” with a significant positive anomaly of sound propagation). Given these “aquarium” test conditions (not related to the sea) the question already arises: why the result was so small?
Homeland must know its "heroes". The developer of programs and methods for such "advanced" tests is the head of the torpedo section of the Central Research Institute of the Navy Voloshin S.P.. The same man - a developer TTP on OCD "Clematis", closed because obviously unrealistic deadlines and requirements and the lack of scientific and technical basis for their implementation.
More examples? You are welcome: one of our traditional “tricks” with tests of torpedoes allegedly in “jamming” conditions is the installation of sonar countermeasures (by the way, very expensive) "aside", so that they "do not interfere with torpedoes to be guided". Or use in such, under favor, trials, obviously ancient and completely ineffective sgpd, like MG-34 and GIP-1.
Yes, as a matter of fact, the very fact of the absence of torpedo fire (with heads on) in the Arctic speaks for itself!
With the tests of our torpedoes for a long time, everything is very, very bad.
Comment on the website of the "military-industrial complex" to article C. Zhandarov 10.02.2015 g.
... with all the “touching care” of Zhandarov about FOSS, he, being a representative of the Concern MPO Gidropribor in Moscow, "Forgot" to note the fact, that weapons tests in the Arctic are not only not being conducted, but they personally lobbied for the product, so to speak, "Limited combat capability" in the Arctic, without the necessary tests.
The bottom line here is as follows.
Copper-magnesium circuit electric batteries, which are the main for the torpedoes of the Navy, never tested cold water plodding tests.
Values, specified in specifications, are not even “theoretical”, but actually borrowed from silver-magnesium batteries (where with the "cold cocking" everything is fine). There is good reason to believe, what's on "cold water" (figures in documents are given) charging and starting the battery just won't happen, ie. the torpedo will be absolutely uncompetitive. The reason for this scandalous situation: Defense industry of the USSR, being unable to secure supplies of silver-magnesium batteries for new submarine torpedoes 3 generations due to lack of silver, in the early 80s replaced it with copper. “Questions” arose, incl. and on cold water, however on those, who asked them, turned out to be powerful pressure. An “autopsy” of the situation with copper-magnesium batteries for the defense industry would “roll off” a series of torpedoes and raise tough questions for the Navy and the Ministry of Defense as the submarine’s ammunition, and in accordance with the positions held by persons, admitting all this.
Considering, that today's "chief torpedo adviser" of the commander in chief of the Navy Korolev, Vice Admiral Shevchenko (he is "part-time" and "chief Arctic admiral"), since ancient years is the main enemy of the “Physicist” torpedo, promoting not just obsolete products with extremely low performance characteristics (for example Kant), including. not providing reliable use in the Arctic, talking about all this is necessary, moreover, openly and publicly. For r reports. Shevchenko in the "high offices", to put it mildly, objectivity do not differ.
Notes Colorado Cockroach. Gopnik, Semyon and the Russian view of Ukraine
retired vice admiral A. Shevchenko.
It is to them that “information” is disseminated, eg, about the allegedly exceptional toxicity of unitary fuel "Physics".
On the actual situation, the leading specialists of OJSC Morteplotekhnika V expressed exhaustively. F. Gurov and Yu. AND. Sannikov:
The opinion in some circles of the Navy about the high toxicity of fuel is extremely exaggerated. During the operation of torpedoes, the Navy personnel may encounter the problem of fuel toxicity only in an emergency during depressurization of the fuel tank. Note, what the 40 years of handling fuel, there was not a single case of occupational disease or poisoning at the Research Institute of Mortgage Engineering, despite repeated direct contact with fuel. US torpedo weapon, using Otto-Fuel II fuel, operated in dozens of countries on all continents.
Practical torpedoes Mk48 and children in the torpedo compartment of the submarine. Unlike our torpedoes, in Mk48 fuel is not encapsulated, and the torpedoes themselves in the photo have traces of heavy use (shooting)
The fact of low toxicity of a unitary fuel is confirmed by memories C. AND. Berdichesky in the third volume of the book "Central Research Institute" Gidropribor "and his people" with a description of the "terry" violations of security measures for the treatment of unitary fuel. for example, he repeatedly, unable to even wash, walked for several days drenched in "working out" of oil and fuel after maintenance of a torpedo from the sea. Nevertheless, any serious health effects. AND. There was no berdic.
In the end, the author of this article, understanding the topic of unitary fuel, deemed it necessary to check it on yourself, what Shevchenko personally reported back in 2012 g. ie. the, what did Shevchenko do and does, these are not “good faith misconceptions” (for objective information was provided to him repeatedly), but a very specific "interest".
Well, on the "PR" g. Shevchenko as "outstanding, but underrated naval commander " (incl. search operation "Atrine") appropriate to quote the commander of the multi-purpose submarine K-244 (Atrina member), captain 1 retired rank B. Alikova:
Errors of the Atrino Production and Commercial Administration in preparation and during the campaign predetermined the loss of stealth of boats.
Testing of joint actions of submarines in tactical groups was carried out “in general” order, whatever the composition of the groups, which was assigned to conduct search operations, and not with the commanders of those tactical groups. This practice was formal, since it did not provide for the formation of mutual understanding of specific people, and even ruled out the possibility of remembering the acoustic portraits of those boats, with whom it was necessary to "catch" the enemy.
Interact with each other in the operation, with no other radar force, attracted to participate in Atrin, submarines could not, because the preparatory work for the interaction was not actually carried out.
... setting, which was preparing for the "Atrin", characterizes the episode, ... nitpicking and provocation of the commander Shevchenko, including public, commander brought to that, that promised to shoot him.
16 October 2018 g. in the newspaper "VPK" g. Shevchenko was publicly asked questions and offers to publicly explain his actions on a number of issues, incl.
4. Lobbying instead of the “Physics” of another torpedo, TTX is much worse, than the Mk48 mod.1 (1971 year), that is, the advancement of a 30-40-year-old known delay in the Navy’s torpedo weapon from the world level.
5. Exceptions to the necessary tests of this torpedo with reasonable doubts about its combat effectiveness in the Arctic ...
Here a question may arise about the position of the author on the torpedo "Physicist" (all the more so since earlier in a number of documents he considered questions of performing such firing by a number of other torpedo models). The point here is simple.: a long range torpedo is needed under the ice (no less than the effective range of enemy torpedoes), having a good noise-resistant digital homing and remote control system. We have one for today: "Physicist-1" (with all its advantages and disadvantages).
At the same time, Physics has problems, and serious (especially on just antique remote control (with towed boat reel), corresponding to the western level of the 60s of the last century). But eliminating them is not just real, we simply have no right to other options, for the price of the issue is the combat effectiveness of the submarine forces of the Navy and the military stability (more about this in detail below).
To benefit from the export of Russian weapons and whether it helps to saturate the Russian troops with the latest technology?
According to official statements by the Navy and the Ministry of Defense following the results of combat training for 2018 g. not a single prize of the commander-in-chief with bearers carrying the Physicist-1 torpedo was received. Considering, that the “Physicist” has the highest performance characteristics of all domestic torpedoes, a logical conclusion follows that there are very serious problems with the development of this torpedo in the fleet.
There is nothing surprising in this, and the reasons for this have long been called.
I'm sure, the first firing under the ice we will be largely a failure. And this is an objective fact.. Nothing wrong: tough and decisive elimination of identified deficiencies, and firing again. Disadvantages again? Again their elimination and firing. And the problem will be solved, for, repeat, no technical problems, everything is within our power and is decided. The question is exclusively in the rigid formulation of the question (as previously done with Poliment-Redut air defense missile system).
Our submarines must have a reliable and effective torpedo weapon and be able to use it in all conditions (incl. under the ice)!
At the same time, it is extremely advisable to modernize the Fizik-1 torpedo (previously released products) with the introduction of modern telecontrol and a number of other issues (set out in non-public documents).
Yes, a number of "respected" defense industry organizations (first of all, SPBM “Malachite”) declare it: "Fine! You are welcome, us OCD billions on 5 and year 3-4 for work" (actually “mastering” this financing).
And the officials of the Ministry of Defense in DOGOZ will say: "Good, we “planned” it. Beginning of work approximately 2023 Mr. ".
No, gentlemen! From your mind and conscience, you had to do everything “yesterday”! Including. within the framework of OJSC “Case”. Today, taking into account the importance of these works, the decision on their implementation can and should be made out according to the results of the first firing, and the work itself is not carried out within the framework of the new OCD (there is simply no time for it, it had to be done “yesterday and immediately”), but in order 307 GUEST (“Product refinement”), subject to (previously created) touched, in particular for hose STU delivered to the customer in the early 2000s (with a torpedo 211TT1), and fiber optic STU "Steering Wheel" with characteristics at the level of the best foreign samples (2005 city).
Hose reel and 211TT1 torpedo telecontrol system and its application
Some material and documentary results of the ROC "Steering Wheel"
Towed bathysphere with the equipment "Pipe". Atlantic, end of the 80s.
The author and a number of experts repeatedly raised the question of using a number of results of the research work “Pipe” (AKIN, Frolov D.P.) in the "new" Physics ". These are not “theories,” but rather concrete, practical breakthrough results., received at sea (Atlantic ocean) for real sub-goals. The implementation of these proposals in "Physics" provides not just a multiple increase in its effectiveness, and the real possibility of winning “underwater duels” against the newest “Virginia”, even the old fighter "Ryazan" (project 667BDR) (with "new Physicists" and anti-torpedoes). I stress: several leading Physics developers left Frolov’s group, knew perfectly well his results, and repeatedly raised the question of their application in "Physics" and "Case".
The fact, what is this question, despite repeated calls in a “closed format”, have to put in public, eloquently shows "interest" (quoted) in this by the officers of the Navy. For all this time, no one even bothered to pick up and read test materials!
Chief Designer "Physics" g. Grigoryev should not give interviews to various resources (and with knowingly false information) and deal with the flaws of your torpedo. At the moment, the grounds for self-PR in the media at. Grigoriev is not, what good is in Physics - the merit of his predecessors.
The most massive UST-80 torpedo in the Navy has no remote control, and her homing systems (two options: Waterfall and Ceramics) not just “out of date”. It's a lot worse. Since its “birth”, the powerful low-frequency SSN “Waterfall”, the main one for USET-80, has extremely low noise immunity, and in ice conditions is practically inoperative.
AT 1989 g. due to the extremely low noise immunity of the “Waterfall” at shallow depths, the USET-80 received the mid-frequency low-power SSN “Ceramics” (literally from the developer’s book: "Reproduced on a domestic base" with the SSN of the American torpedo Mk46mod.1, 1961 city), what, properly, is a shameful page of domestic torpedo building.
The expert from the United States to admire the power of Russian submarines "Ash"
USET-80 torpedoes with SSN Vodopad and Keramika on racks in the torpedo compartment of a project 949A APRK. A photo: Magazine MO "Landmark"
Until now, the SSN "Ceramics", despite its extremely low performance characteristics, is the most common Navy torpedo navy.
The use of USET-80 with Ceramics in ice conditions is possible with very significant restrictions, and at minimum (Pistol) distances, though, that the firing positions of enemy torpedoes are almost an order of magnitude higher than ours (TTH torpedo - just awkward). Figuratively speaking, the enemy has a sniper rifle against our pistol, and this in the conditions of a significant lead in its detection!
In such a situation, the clash of a Russian nuclear submarine with an American or British one will be described by the word "execution", and there will be practically no exceptions to this rule.
Subject to the foregoing and the only (and effective!) the answer can only be “Physicist”. Statements by some “experts” about “high-speed submarines” (SPR) as “effective weapons in the Arctic,” are biased and have no serious basis. The main thing is that effective enemy torpedo shooting distances far exceed theoretically achievable maximum distances of “new squalls”. ie. the enemy can shoot us from a safe distance with impunity (where you can’t even get it with the “new Flurry”). First and last time, when this hot point was discussed publicly, was at a round table on torpedoes at the Army 2015 forum. Objections to the author's arguments on the ratio of firing distances (the torpedoes hurt a lot, than the SPR) the chief designer of the SPR who was present was not found.
The problem of "data entry"
ibid, at Army 2015, representatives of the Navy expressed an extremely controversial thesis: "Let the old ships survive with the old torpedoes". I stress, this was announced a year and a half after a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in 2014 city!
At all, the very division of ships into "old" and "new" is stupid. A ship is a combat unit, while he is in service, he must be combat-ready and undergo timely modernization. There is no sound logic behind this statement..
The real reason is the “problem of entering data into new torpedoes on old media”, more precisely, simply "wild" financial requests of the developer of BIUS - concern "Morinformsistema - Agat" and SPBM "Malachite" (as the parent organization for torpedo systems) to pay for these works. It comes to three-digit amounts (in millions of rubles). And this is only a "refinement" and "registration". The cost of new BIUS is billions. Totally abnormal, when in purchases for the modernization of the AIC “Irkutsk”, the cost of a new CIU is almost equal to the cost of a new sonar complex.
Moreover, “our BIOS” is not Western ASBUs, which are actually "smart add-ons" over sonar, and the processing of tactical information and the use of weapons is carried out by them not only at the "geometric level" (as we have in BIUS), but also "signal". Against this background, all Russian BIUS submarines are simply “rudimentary”, and their extremely high cost is associated, apparently, so as, that "someone really wants bold budget financing". Moreover, for the sake of these "willing" we "strangled" all the development of small-sized devices for entering data into weapons and "mini-BIUS". For the situation itself when a small-sized device for extremely little money does the main part of the work of the huge and extremely expensive BIUS (calculation of firing data and their input) It raises questions. And this is not some kind of "amateur activity". for example, data input module, in one of the developed PRVs it is the same with the BIUS data input module on the submarine "St. Petersburg" (providing including. and remote control torpedoes). And such examples can be continued.
Backup Data Entry Devices
The author of this article in the Navy worked on (together with interested representatives of central authorities and organizations) questions of "insertion" of new modules and PRV into the standard firing systems on serial ships of the Navy. All of this was absolutely real., did not require significant funds, however ended up in nothing. To the leadership of some defense industry companies, this turned out to be "extremely unnecessary" (for huge new BIUS for them mean corresponding income), and they managed to "convey" this opinion to the command of the Navy.
for comparison: having received two Tang submarines in the early 80s (our peers 611 project), Turkish Navy independently carried out their rapid modernization, ensuring the use of new torpedoes (incl. Mk48), - due to the installation of a “mini-bus" VATOS. AT 1999 g. the same submarines received a more modern version - VATOS Mk2
Russian soldiers will take part in the Victory Day parade in South Ossetia
Mini-BIUS VATOS Mk2 (1999city) A photo: http://turkishnavy.net
ie. what the Turks easily and quickly did for themselves in the 80s, The Russian Navy was never able to do. Navy command did not have the courage to go against certain individuals in the defense industry.
How can one not recall the general designer of non-nuclear submarines Kormilitsin Yu.N.. about the "distant 70s - 80s.":
My reports to the board of the Ministry of Industry about, that the BIUS “Node” consists of only 2-3 racks, and the number of tasks solved corresponds to gigantic in size and power consumption systems of other developers, in those years caused strong resistance in the Ministry and the directorial corps of the ship industry. The thing is, that the introduction of BIUS “Node” led ... to a sharp reduction in the consumption of financial and labor resources ... "self-distillation" of BIUS, acoustic and navigation systems led to the creation of mastodons 3 and 4 generations, inferior in total qualities to the ships of the probable enemy, and unjustified costs.
Good question: will there be an admiral in the fleet, able to toughly raise problematic issues before the defense industry?
Given the recent statements by Admiral Evmenov about "readiness" to accept the problem head orders Yasen-M and Borey-A already this year (virtually without all the necessary tests) this question, apparently, extremely difficult for the Navy ...
Is it necessary to raise such acute “special issues” in the public media?
There is another aspect here: Is it necessary to raise such acute “special issues” in the public media?? It depends on situation, but in it, what today we have with the Russian Navy, when many critical problematic issues are “crushed” and “varnished”, when arming under the guise of “new and promising weapons and military equipment” is sometimes delivered “antiques” (moreover, without conducting full tests), nothing else remains. Our problems are not in “technology”, and "organizations", - unwillingness to objectively assess the situation and accept difficult, but necessary decisions.
Patriotism is not “varnishing” and hiding the “unpleasant truth”, and the ability to objectively see problems and the environment, hard set and decide, incl. "Heavy" issues of the country's defense.
A vivid example of this situation is the repeatedly mentioned article by Rear Admiral, retired Lutsky, about the problems of anti-torpedo protection of our latest submarines!
... submarines of the Ash and Borey projects under construction are proposed to be equipped with PTZ systems, technical specifications for the development of which were made back in the 80s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these weapons against modern torpedoes indicate an extremely low probability of non-defeat of evading submarines.
The question was repeatedly raised at all levels ... However, an extremely expensive and ineffective "antiques", which Lutsky wrote about in The Maritime Collection 2010 city, Navy is still being procured (is in the latest tenders on the public procurement website)!
Torpedoes as a critical element of the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces
The question arises: and can, all this is a trifle, planes fly, boats from the pole rockets shoot, and here some strange torpedoes?..
In one of the responses to publications on the “ice problems of our torpedoes”, in an interview with Nation News correspondent TASS B military observer. Litovkin said:
armed forces need to be assessed together. for example, the Russian Navy has strategic missile forces ... no one can say, that the Russian side is weaker than America ... in some respects we are inferior to the United States, but at the same time they are retreating in air defense and missile defense systems. Russia is much stronger in the ground forces. You can tear out individual facts, but you need to be able to rise above the details and see the big picture, and she talks about, that we are at least second, if not the first militarily world power.
Or another example: interview (on the same issue) Izvestia, Head of the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis A. Mikhailova:
To discuss the combat effectiveness of the most powerful Russian fleet - the Northern - from the point of view of conducting training firing of a particular type of weapon, including those specified by the author of the publication of torpedoes "Physicist-1", at least unprofessionally
…during 2018 years, the Northern Fleet conducted a series of exercises and firing involving missile cruisers, nuclear submarines, anti-submarine and other warships with cruise missile firing, as well as naval aviation and air defense and coast guard units. Practical exercises confirm Russia's military control over the Arctic.
European "Killer Su" was no use
Furthermore, in August 2013 g. arriving with a report on the problems of the Navy's torpedo weapons at the High Command of the Navy, the author is faced with the "point of view" of a senior naval commander, supervised the work of special services of the Navy and shipbuilding:
I do not care [another was used (obscene) expression] to your torpedoes, my "Bulava" does not fly!!!
torpedoes (and marine underwater weapons) - this is not “something not very important”, this is the most critical and disastrous direction of the VVST of the Russian Federation, incl. critical to defense and strategic containment. The foundation of the latter is not “flight range and the number of SLBM warheads”, and the inevitability of retaliation, the basis of which is the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces (the most important part of which is marine underwater weapons and torpedoes).
This immediately raises the question of whether it is expedient for Russia to have a marine component of the strategic nuclear forces. (MSYaS). All the means of the "triad" have their drawbacks and advantages, and the reliability of deterrence is ensured by overlapping the shortcomings of some means with the advantages of others. The main problem of land and air units of strategic nuclear forces is their vulnerability to a "disarming" nuclear strike.. To counter this, we must always have at least one, but guaranteed not traceable SSBN (what, certainly, requires their specific grouping in the Navy).
But what's the point of having submarines, who are unable to defend themselves in the event of an enemy attack? What is the point of unarmed "submarine cruisers"? What will they do with the enemy?
We must clearly understand: in the medium term, no one will “break through with battle” along the Northern Sea Route, land troops on the Novosibirsk islands (respectively, development of such events, how the deployment there of coastal anti-aircraft missile systems and their firing, cause, to put it mildly, perplexity).
Russia's threats in the Arctic today come either from under ice and water (US and UK Navy PLA), or from the air (BBC (United States)).
And in the first case, reliable and effective torpedoes in the ammunition complex are actually an opportunity to “own” your part of the Arctic, reliably solve their problems there (incl. MSYaS). Despite all the “peppy” reports, this is not possible now, and "legal rights", as historical experience shows, mean little against the “right of the strong”.
And the situation here is simple: or we will gain strength for underwater confrontation, or they will crush us. And the obviously insecurity of the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces provokes the enemy to "solve problems" by force.
And last, for my "opponents". By "professional attitude". There are two tough criteria here.: objectivity and the ability to highlight the main thing from the secondary. And the attitude to an extremely important issue on the scale of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (readiness for the effective and successful use of torpedo weapons by the Navy in the Arctic) shows, who is who, clearly. This is not only a “duel account" of submarines, this is combat stability not only nuclear forces, but all SNF.
And no matter what “trifle” interested parties try to imagine the combat readiness of Russian torpedoes in the main theaters of operations, in fact, this trifle calls into question the effectiveness of our strategic nuclear forces as a whole.
Now.
Maxim Klimov
