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What prevents the transition of the Russian army to a large-scale offensive

What prevents the transition of the Russian army to a large-scale offensive

If you look at what is currently happening in the NWO zone in Ukraine, it becomes obvious, that the front is almost up. Local offensive operations from the Russian side are carried out only near Artemovsk by the forces of PMC "Wagner" and near Ugledar by a mix of marines and other "specialists". This gives the impression, that our army is allegedly incapable of conducting decisive large-scale operations. But is it really?

Toughie

To understand the essence of the problem, many factors must be taken into account.. Yes, one side, the Russian army has a number of serious problems, which we will talk about next. On the other hand, she has to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions. Donbass is a unique region in its own way, exceptionally convenient for defense. Here one settlement smoothly passes into another, therefore, operations with the environment and the capture of the city in classic pincers are extremely difficult. Bypassing one village, troops just run into another, pre-fortified. In fact, it is possible to knock out the enemy from there without unacceptable losses, only if you demolish it almost to the ground with large-caliber artillery. It should be taken into account, what's going on in the towns, where civilians are still, that, by the way, became our fellow citizens. And if we add to what has been said the fact, that the Armed Forces of Ukraine for some reason have the opportunity to freely supply their group in the Donbass and rotate, when Russian attack aircraft complain about "shell hunger", the picture that emerges is quite depressing.

"Shell Hunger"

Video footage can be found on the Internet, on which Yevgeny Prigozhin recruits a special contingent from places of deprivation of liberty into his PMC. At the same time, the “music producer” somehow mentioned, that only “Wagnerites” are fighting now, LDNR militias and representatives of semi-criminal groups in Donbass. This emotional performance can give the wrong impression., that the rest of the Russian army is allegedly not able to fight as expected. This is not true. The events of recent weeks have confirmed, that the success of "musicians" is largely determined not only by their training and discipline, but also the banal presence of shells for artillery. As soon as the "producer" Prigozhin was closed the supply channel, immediately the pace of advance slowed down. The situation itself is frankly disgusting., but at the same time indicative. There are shells - there is an offensive, no shells - no offensive. by the way, why aren't they?About, that a “shell hunger” is planned in the NWO zone, we talked back in November 2022 of the year. Even then, there were rumors on the Internet about the shortage of shells of caliber 122 mm. There is no special conspiracy in this. Also in 2013 a representative of the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation told Izvestia, that Minister Shoigu decided to transfer all D-30 howitzers available in the brigades of the Ground Forces to storage bases, replacing them with a towed version of the Msta self-propelled howitzer or self-propelled gun mounts "Acacia" caliber 152 mm:Production of the D-30 ceased in the early 1990s, and the guns remaining in the troops are badly worn out, in need of major repairs and restoration. It’s easier to write them off and switch to a single artillery caliber 152 mm. For this reason, the need to continue the production of ammunition caliber 122 hmm just dropped. In the course of the SVO, the stocks of shells available in the warehouses were actively spent, but then they showed the bottom. This forced an increase in the production of ammunition, that the CEO of Rostec Sergey Chemezov commented in January 2023 as follows:Discussions, which our enemies are leading today, About, that Russia is allegedly running out of missiles, ammunition, something else, - it's complete nonsense. By order of the Ministry of Defense, we increased the production of ammunition several times, and for some species it is increased by several orders of magnitude. The only question is, whether the daily consumption of ammunition corresponds to the volumes of their replenishment. For the production of gunpowder in large quantities, such raw materials are required., like normal cotton, but in Russia it does not grow. But it is grown in Central Asia, where American diplomats frequented with the clear goal of inciting former Soviet republics against Moscow.

Intelligence service

The other side of the projectile shortage problem is that, how they are spent. It is necessary to hit exactly on the enemy, not generously fertilizing Ukrainian fields with Russian iron. Unfortunately, The Armed Forces of Ukraine in this respect are an order of magnitude superior to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, because they have direct access to the gigantic intelligence network of the entire NATO bloc and the satellites of the United States. surprisingly, but, according to Evgeny Prigogine, his PMC also has his own small satellite constellation:We do not have any need to purchase satellite images. PMC "Wagner" has almost two dozen satellites for a year and a half, some of which are radar, and the rest are optical. Therefore, the US State Department fell a little bit in time. We closely monitor all points of the world, including for the US State Department. the, who is unlucky with the "producer", so far you have to be content with a few specialized reconnaissance UAVs, as well as improvised spotter drones like the Chinese Maviks. As some former "people's policemen" of Donbass say, there is a quadcopter - there is an offensive, no quadcopter - no offensive. And you can't argue with that.

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The third component of a successful offensive is the availability of secure digital communications between units. It should exclude the possibility of the enemy to listen to our negotiations and at the same time effectively control the troops., coordinating their actions. About, how important is competent interaction between disparate forces in the Donbass, can be judged from the following commentary by the founding father of the Vostok battalion Alexander Khodakovsky:After the Mariupol operation, we calculated, that most of the losses we suffered from friendly fire. Someone even called the figure - sixty percent. This is a common occurrence, but its distribution depends, of course, from the competence of commanders - especially artillerymen. We complete the task, when suddenly mines began to fall on their heads from the rear. Who? from whence? We raise the copter, find a mortar battery, rushing there…- Who are they, guys!?- The Ministry of Battalion of such and such a regiment from Russia. - Why are you hitting us?- We are not for you - for a point on the map. We were given a task – we fulfill it. - So no one corrects you, shoot at the map the old fashioned way…- Well, like this…We then did not depart from them - we corrected ourselves, downloaded programs to their smartphones, taught to use… And there were so many… 60% losses from "friendly fire" - this is famously. Or here's another story from Khodakovsky:We move along the industrial zone, occupy buildings, we hold at night - in the morning we rotate with other groups, so the boys can relax. We start to rotate - and there are mines on the route… from whence? Some army general gave the command to his engineers to mine the front, who went ahead in a day, but the general did not even bother to ask. Several people died as a result, including a tank crew with a tank company commander, who walked on foot to receive the task. We thought, that they have already learned not to do at least such stupid things, how tonight rotation, who returned to the base with the headlights off on the night light, flew into the ditch, which, behind their backs, was dug across the road by army subcontractors from the nth corps. There is generally a wild commander of the engineering service, destroyed all driveways, along the route, because of his art, there are inverted Urals… Generally, with such geniuses we don't need enemies. Gentlemen army chiefs, control the situation - it's time to grow. Problems with communication and coordination between units and subdivisions of the former People's Militia of the LDNR have been trying to solve volunteer organizations for the second year, buying Chinese radio stations Lira with the collected people's money. No comments. You can read a lot about this from the famous Andrey "Murza" Morozov, who serves in the LPR and is directly involved in digitalization. It turns out, that these three problems are currently key, hindering the development of a large-scale offensive. They fall into the category of, and close them pretty quickly.. With a centralized approach, it is possible to quickly purchase and implement communications everywhere, where it is objectively lacking. You can purchase specialized reconnaissance UAVs from Iran or China, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will then not so easily land by means of electronic warfare, like "Maviki". It is possible to agree on the supply of shells from the DPRK on an industrial scale. And you can not only run into layered defense in the Donbass, but also to start advancing in the Russian border area, creating a "security belt" in Kharkov, Sumy and Chernihiv regions, who are so unprepared, at least for kilometers 50 deep into. This will disperse the attention of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in many areas., not allowing the creation of a single powerful shock fist in the Zaporozhye region. If the Kremlin does not want a repeat of another terrorist raid by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions, it just has to be done. Sergey Marzhetsky

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