Command of the Karelian Front, Northern Fleet and the 14th Army.1941 year
For a more objective assessment of the commanders of the Red Army before World War II it is necessary to bear in mind the following facts. At first, a sharp increase in the armed forces before the war led to the need for rapid growth in the number of officers and officers of. it, of course, It had an impact on reducing the level of its preparation.
The problem of replenishment of command personnel was solved primarily through the call to active military service of reserve officers. AT 1939-1940 years from the reserve was intended more 175 thousand. individual command personnel, many of which were subsequently enrolled in the cadres of the Red Army. The level of training commanders of the stock does not meet the requirements of time, could not fully ensure the fulfillment of its obligations.
Another source of replenishment of command personnel has been a sharp increase in the number of military schools, reduction in terms of their training and increase staffing levels constant and variable composition. AT 1940 It was opened 42 New ground school. Almost all military academies in 1940 year for junior officers of the reserve, Red 2-year service life - even a one-year period of study. of course, that in such a short time to prepare professionally competent platoon commander it was virtually impossible.
When the war commanding and commanding staff trained 19 Academies, 10 military departments at civilian universities, 7 higher naval schools; 203 military schools and 68 Advanced courses, in which there were more than 300 thousand. human. However, even this number of schools did not provide the needs of the troops. Military district commander were forced to organize its decision in the districts many short-term (6-periods) courses for junior lieutenants.
Despite the measures taken to increase the number of command personnel, completely solve the problem failed. As of 1 January 1941 , the payroll number of command personnel of the army and navy was 579 581 human, of them on the ground forces had 426 942 man, - BBC 113 086, MoD - 39 553 man. Shortage of command personnel of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army to top 1941 I was over 18%.
Secondly, on the qualitative and quantitative status of the command staff had a negative impact of repression against military personnel, at which the peak of 1937 and 1938 years. The total number of victims yet not precisely determined. According to a report by the head of department officers of the Red Army E NKO. A. Shtadenko of 5 May 1940 year 1936 – 1938 – 1939 years from the army were dismissed 18 240 human, that was 3,9 % by headcount command personnel. As if he had not so much, especially if we consider the percentage, but still keep in mind, What's on 1 May 1940 Year of the illegally dismissed was returned to the army - 12 461 human. But they were dismissed commanders and political instructors of the highest rank, had a rich combat experience. In just a few years, were replaced all the commanders of districts, on 90% - their deputies, on 80% - management staff corps and divisions. AT 1937 year from the army were dismissed 1469 political workers, of them members of the military council, heads of political administrations of military districts and their deputies - 18, military commissars towers - 16, military commissars of divisions - 57.
1941 year, The commander of the Reserve Front Army General Georgy Zhukov at a meeting with the officers at the command post at Yelnya
In the criminal liability of the number of laid-off, according to the newspaper "Pravda" 17 October 1990 of the year, It was drawn and convicted in 1936 year - 263, at 1937 year - 1684, at 1938 year - 1041, at 1939 year - 463, at 1940 year - 63, at 1941 year - 816 human. it, undoubtedly, It influenced the creation of the moral atmosphere in the army, which was dominated by a general suspicion, fear of making independent decisions, seeking out enemies, sometimes direct whistleblowing. This is not a complete list of consequences of Stalinist repression against the command staff. All this could not affect the state of command and commanding structure.
Thirdly, should be considered, that the repression and the increase in the fighting strength of the armed forces resulted in a large staff movements, especially in 1938-1939 years. Vacant posts were filled by untrained people, who did not have the proper experience. for example, the group of front-line positions from the commander of the regiment and above for 1939 year produced 2452 appointment or 73,9% their staff numbers. There have been cases, when the division commanders were appointed battalion commander in the rank of captain. When such cases reported to the People's Commissar of Defense. E. Voroshilov, then he began to defy the, that they have C. M. Budyonny in the civil war, and there was no such titles, but they did not prevent them from smashing white generals. A newly appointed commanders of the People's Commissar advised to learn.
As a result of such personnel policy before the war in the ground forces in military link DC - regiment average 75% commanders were length of service in a post to one year. Likewise was the case in other branches of the armed forces.
Fourth, we must not forget also that, that the level of education of the Red Army on the eve of the war staff remained extremely low. The number of commanders of the persons with higher education 1940 year was the total number of 2,9%.
Fifth, one of the quality indicators of team composition was the presence of his combat experience. By the beginning of the war the Red Army left about 10% officers and officers of, who had experience of the Civil War, and about 15% komnachsostava gained combat experience during armed conflicts 1938-1940 years, as well as fighting in China and Spain.
Considering all these factors, we can conclude, which before the war was carried out extensive work on the preparation of the team staff, However, not everything has been done, and carried out mass repression against military cadres significantly undermined the fighting capacity of the Red Army.
should say, that evaluating our commanders, Chief of the German General Staff, wrote in his diary: "Russian officer corps exceptionally bad. It makes the worst impression, than in 1933 year. Russia will need 20 years, until it reaches the same height ". apparently, something Halder was right. But we must not forget, not through 20 years, and after long and hard four years' bad officer corps "routed the fascist Germany and its satellites.Gabriel Tsobehiya
