The reports on the course of the NMD necessarily list the facts of the use of artillery (stem and jet) like our, and Ukrainian troops. This is due to the fact, that the importance of artillery in a modern large-scale conflict is paramount! Therefore, today we will analyze the use of artillery., because there are questions: why not immediately destroy all the batteries and rocket launchers? why do we have the numerical advantage of artillery, and we cannot stop the shelling of Donbass, Lugansk, Kherson, Energodar and villages of the Belgorod region? where are our valiant warriors, Is their knowledge and experience worse?, than the enemy?! can, we are lagging behind in strength and power?
Questions are simple, but there will be no easy answers.
What has changed and why is it difficult
The new type of war also changed the conduct of counter-battery combat. (hereinafter - CBB). What is CBB at its core? This defeat (destruction, suppression) fire on enemy targets to gain fire superiority and perform assigned combat missions while preventing the enemy from performing such. Based on the words "counter", "battery" and "fight", it is the struggle of our weapons against the weapons of the enemy, be it guns vs howitzers, missile OTRK "Iskander" against HIMARS or the organization of a raid by UAV "Lancet" on the position of Ukrainian mortars.
As the layman imagines KBB?
Observers with binoculars in the trenches, airborne spotter, sound measuring station in the silence of the rear forest and army special forces behind enemy lines. In the classical sense of the old wars (World War I, VOV) is an artillery duel, gun against gun. Scouts revealed, identified and given coordinates, gunners took, shot at the benchmark and struck at the enemy battery. Not suppressed - the "answer" flew in.
Static prevailed over dynamics. for example, at the first stage of the battle for Leningrad, the term "stable enemy battery" was used, i.e. battery, held in one position for a long time. Only from February 1942 year, the Soviet command in a planned manner changed the entire organization of counter-battery combat from passive to offensive.
And in peacetime, the development of the KBB theory did not stand still. In combat regulations, in artillery training courses and in the rules of firing and artillery fire control, complete with a manual (PSiUOA 1990, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2011 years) enough attention has been paid to this type of combat.
An analysis of the history of the development of the CBB for the period of the 20th and especially the beginning of the 21st century shows, that direct artillery confrontation has taken on the character of a rather rare phenomenon on the battlefields. The world of war from large-scale hostilities and a continuous front line from sea to sea has narrowed to a theater of local conflicts: Arab-Israeli wars, Vietnam, Falklands, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, Georgia, Syria. One side always had an advantage over the other due to the power of fire and reconnaissance equipment.. Having a stronger, equipped and developed data acquisition system, together with the fire component, led to, what's the other, weaker, the enemy was uncompromisingly destroyed. Although there were rare examples, when the Soviet shooting in Vietnam 130 mm cannon M46 high-explosive fragmentation shells at a distance 27 kilometers spoiled the nerves of the Americans with their caliber guns 155. But now our fighters are not in the jungles of Vietnam and not among the sands of Syria.
New reality
It was smooth on paper, yes, they forgot about the ravines - theory without practice is dead. Real, the huge scale of the joint work of reconnaissance and fire weapons, the rate of change in the operational environment, pressure of events, as in SVO, our Russian army did not have. It is the real combat interaction, and not a range at the exercises. I had to learn right off the bat in the heat of battle.
A strong and numerous enemy opposes us in the still Ukrainian expanses. This enemy is not only experienced and trained by NATO specialists. This enemy is equipped with excellent and Soviet, and western arsenal. This enemy is commanded by excellent Western experts, using the best modern means of communication and control. Ground complexes, air and space intelligence of the United States and its allies in real time provide information to our enemy. All of them are combined into a single, not just an automated weapon control system., and into a network system for analyzing events and making decisions with elements of artificial intelligence.
The enemy is testing elements of the new concept of Multidomain battle as the ability to simultaneously wage war in various associated domains: drought, sea, air, space, cyberspace. This is "information and fire control of combat clusters in a spatial environment of a multi-domain type". Continuous Surveillance and Intelligence, constant combat readiness, interaction, rebuilding and regrouping, obstruction of the enemy, immediate response to a threat, prioritization and preemptive fire strike. Continuous application of the OODA cycle across all troops.
example: fighter, while in the air, if it is detected by the onboard anti-ship missile launch complex in the direction of its own ship, assessing the situation, performs an operation to intercept this target, controlling the launch and guidance of a non-own missile, and missiles from the attacked ship. And vice versa. Or together on one or more enemy objects.
goal: to win tomorrow, need to change the way we wage war now.
Tasks: overcome the enemy defense system by constantly maneuvering and interacting combat units, leading actions in various environments while maintaining their complete freedom of action and the ability to flexible transformation of fire capabilities. Not coordinating the actions of the ground forces, aviation, fleet, satellite constellation and other branches of the military, and the creation of such opportunities, which would allow, if necessary, aviation to use the capabilities of the ground forces and space, infantrymen - the capabilities of the fleet and aviation, that is, at the same time, the possibilities of everyone to everyone always and everywhere.
Fiction? Not anymore.
example: the presence of Ukrainian units at the platoon-company-battalion level of CTOCW terminals and StarLink stations made it possible to create closed local information networks for each unit, which provide them with direct communication and fire control, taking into account data from any type of intelligence online. This is an active element of the organization of combat interaction in the "earth - air - space" environment..
Now that, how it changed the CBB on the battlefield.
Tactics of "roaming guns"
Major Changes in Nine Months:
- wrestling in space instead of wrestling on a plane;
- the global scale of the impact of weapons;
- priority for intelligence - aerospace and information component;
- the presence of open flanks, gaps and gaps in the operational formation on the line of contact;
- fire contact of troops - contact "long-range defeat";
- destruction of not only enemy troops, but also its key infrastructure, state and military administration, the economy;
— decentralized management, collection and transmission of information;
- constant force information impact on the troops and population of the enemy.
Which of these was used in KBB?
In our case, the ideal solution for gaining superiority over the enemy is aerospace reconnaissance and a long-range strike to kill reserves, concentrating factions, at ammunition and fuel service sites. Or when enemy armored personnel carriers follow marching columns at a distance of more than 30-40 kilometers from the front line. After all, they travel along the roads at a certain speed and in a clear direction.. But the enemy is not a fool - he complies with the conditions of maximum camouflage and radio silence. Tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - coordinated highly mobile concentration and dispersal in established operational areas.
Artillery unit, appointed by the Ukrainian command to maintain the KKB in the amount of 10 to 12 cannon or rocket artillery guns, divided into several battle groups - from two to four guns (installations) in a group. Providing such combat units (groups) completely autonomous and planned by the senior of the group independently: from food and ammunition supply to maintenance and registration of combat losses. The group is assigned its area of responsibility of approximately 100 quarter. km, so as to ensure firing at possible targets at extreme ranges. At the same time, there is a constant, but the movement regulated within the boundaries of this section in the maximum radio silence mode, efficiency and disguise. The position changes regardless of whether, guns fired or not. No permissions are required for such actions.. The command is informed about the change of location and time, necessary for relocation to a new point. Each combat unit has a main and several spare directions for firing, as well as a single fire control point with your area (districts) responsibility. All groups and command posts are combined into a single local information network and operate as part of the field artillery tactical data transmission system (AFATDS).
CTOCW and StarLink equipment was mentioned above, which in seconds allows you to get all the necessary calculations for shooting. Through these terminals in real time from the KKB radar, air or space reconnaissance, the fire control point receives data on the purpose of the target. The task of the control room is immediate, from the moment of receiving the coordinates of the location of the group, issuance of data on the target and results of fire. Or vice versa - the combat unit receives the coordinates of the target in advance simultaneously with the indication of the coordinates of the place for firing. The task of the group is to arrive at the designated point, prepare and shoot. The center can specify a "window" in time, during which the task must be completed. The rest is at the discretion of the main group.. A unit or even a single weapon can start firing on its own, after which he conducts an anti-fire maneuver. The maximum number of shots does not exceed five per gun.
Now we count. Minimum time, necessary to bring into combat position, - three to four minutes. Firing rate - five shots per minute. The flight of the M-777 howitzer projectile to the maximum range is almost a minute more. That is, it takes no more than 5-6 minutes to complete a combat mission.. Leaving the firing position after firing takes a maximum of three minutes.
In the KBB theory, to complete the task of immediately hitting an enemy object, it is necessary, to cycle exploration (decision to use, preparation for a fire mission, its implementation) did not exceed half of the minimum time for the target to stay in place. In our case, the required response time cannot be more than three and a half minutes., better twice as much. Calculations should be carried out from the time of notching the first shot, but this may not happen right away.. And it is desirable to answer not with one shot, but in one gulp. A very difficult task.
Has there been anything like this before?? Yes, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940. The guns of the White Finns were old, mainly with a flat firing trajectory, shells were missing. But they fought skillfully and compensated for the shortcomings of their artillery with the art of its combat use.. Excellent disguise: they glued cotton wool instead of snow falling from trees and covered the muzzle cone from guns in the snow with a special camouflage net. False and spare positions, sound imitation and imitation of flashes of shots from false firing positions, firing during periods of fire work of artillery of the Red Army. And most importantly! Massive use of the tactics of "roaming" guns. They fired at previously targeted areas in short fire raids with a change in firing position. Soviet artillery reconnaissance simply did not have time to respond to suppression. Winter, short daylight hours, fogs, snowfalls - nor observers, neither aviation could sometimes help.
How did our gunners solve this problem? Only by developing a set of measures and by joint efforts of all types of reconnaissance and artillery, which were summarized in a separate Instruction on the organization of the CBB. The analysis of these battles provides an understanding and effectiveness of various types of reconnaissance.. Instrumental first. (sound metric) - almost half of all identified positions, on the second aerial reconnaissance - more 30 percent.
How to solve the problem of "roaming gun tactics" performed by the Ukronazis now? What can we oppose? What means and methods are the most effective?
During the NWO, statistics were obtained on the use of various reconnaissance means (radar, optoelectronic, UAV) and their methods of interaction with means of fire destruction. The undisputed leader in the minimum amount of time for a notch, identification, the time of entering into the database and issuing accurate settings for shooting, taking into account the action to the full depth of our weapons, is a UAV. example: at the beginning of May in the Luhansk region, near the village of Podgornoye, the first M-777 howitzers were destroyed by artillery. The target was first detected by a drone, then a blow to the positions was dealt by loitering UAVs "Cube" and then, when trying to get away from the raid, started from the air completed by the joint venture "Hyacinth". Fire "flowers" were carried out according to data from space reconnaissance equipment. so, about intelligence.
If you want victory - scout the enemy
What is intelligence for?? To know, where the enemy is and what maneuver he planned to make. What is important for intelligence? Range, coordinate accuracy, time to detect, time to transmit information, authenticity.
Required:
- increase the range of active operations (only half of the enemy's targets are set on time, the distance to the other half does not allow them to be detected and coordinates determined);
- improve the accuracy of determining coordinates (need to reduce the error, to get maximum combat effectiveness with minimum projectile consumption);
— reduce the time for processing and data transfer (the minimum reaction time between the moment of reliable identification of the target and its defeat).
What physical principles are used in modern intelligence systems? The principles are simple: emission and reception of waves in acoustic, optical or radio band, because everything, what moves in the environment, or itself creates a perturbation of this environment, or reacts to the influence of a wave from the outside, reflecting and partially absorbing it. Main types: sound, radar, optoelectronic (optical), radio engineering. They are used jointly and on different carriers - from a simple stereo tube at a command post to space satellites. Let's take a closer look at some of them..
Sound intelligence.
From the reports of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: "Artillery reconnaissance systems B75 "Penicillin", covering the offensive of the allied forces, in Ternov (south of Svatov) discovered positions of M-777 howitzers made in the USA. They were hit by high-precision projectiles Krasnopol and Centimeter..
When firing from guns and mortars, when launching rockets and missiles, shock impulses arise from the explosion of a propellant explosive or the burning of jet fuel. The process is accompanied by acoustic phenomena - the muzzle wave of a gun shot, rocket acoustic wave and ballistic wave, inherent in the projectile, and rockets. Falling to the ground, they form a falling wave. Projectiles fly at supersonic speeds, therefore, the impulses of their air shock waves are powerful and far audible. Main characteristics: the magnitude of the amplitude of the excess pressure of the wave, propagation speed and spectral composition of this signal. Caliber, barrel length, loading density, chamber size, gunpowder type, and here's every gun and mortar, shooting, has its own voice and timbre - bass, baritone or bel canto. These "fingerprints" are unique to this product., so "Msta-B" sounds completely different, than M-777. Night and early morning, very coldy, snow melting, drizzling rain, snowfall and fog are good for sound intelligence. poorly, when it's hot in summer, thunderstorm and strong gusty wind. And the roar of many guns does not contribute to observations. The main advantage is passivity. Nothing is emitted, but only accepted, processed and transmitted. The first hardware measuring instruments appeared in the second half of the 19th century., when the coordinates of the enemy battery were calculated, observing the flashes or smoke of a cannon shot and visually establishing the direction of the position, and then calculating the distance with, eg, sound rangefinder Le Boulanger as a device for measuring time, passed from the flash to the sound of the shot. Ears and membranes changed microphone, from chronoscopy moved to chronography. The revolution at the end of the 20th century was completed by an on-board digital computer with a library of artillery system sound samples. Simultaneous reception and processing of large amounts of data using comparison algorithms, binding on the ground using any system of geostationary satellites gave an excellent result.
But everyone went their own way. The guys from across the ocean spent decades "democratizing" the whole world, fighting with semi-partisan detachments of dissenters. The task with sound was implemented as a direction in the fight against small arms, creating situational awareness systems. FROM 2008 of the year, Swats, worn on the shoulder of a KMP fighter, was put into service, stationary Ears FSS for military bases and Ears VMS for cars from QinetiQ, Raytheon's Boomerang sniper shot locator based on highly directional microphones. Can determine the position of the shooter with an accuracy of up to 15 degrees during 1 sec. after the shot. Works reliably in urban low-rise buildings and when driving at speeds up to 80 km / h, mounted on any vehicle. Data is displayed on the LCD panel, and information about the shooter is announced by voice message: shot type, range, azimuth, eg, fire from the rear - Shot, 6:00. Modular, comfortable, informative.
In the United States, in urban areas, such systems are used to alert the police.. Hanging on poles. The truth is not in all, but only in the rich. The poor don't put. pointless: shoot too often and at once from all sides. French with 2017 of the year equip their armored vehicles with mobile acoustic systems for detecting a shot of the Metravib Pilar V version, which are paired with a machine gun.
What else do our Western "partners" have? In the UK, the not-so-new HALO Mk2 system catches a 155-mm projectile at 20 kilometers under ideal weather conditions. Israel has better ARTILOC: detects the same caliber at a distance of up to 40 km. But such, as a sound-thermal reconnaissance station "Penicillin", no one has!
None of the sound intelligence systems, previously mentioned, cannot accurately determine the coordinates of the firing MLRS. Sound from the launch and flight of rockets, that move with running engines, is strikingly different from a cannon artillery shot. Classical methods of sound-measuring notation give a big error. Joint efforts of high-definition TV cameras, thermal imagers, sound seismic sensors, on-board computer with new comparison and analysis algorithms give excellent results. High accuracy in determining the coordinates of the shot and the place where the projectile fell, analysis and target selection by caliber as at the time of the shot, and when breaking at the target with the speed of calculations, not exceeding five seconds! The Russian army needs more of these "drugs" to treat the advanced "Ukrainian disease".
Radar.
From the reports of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: "In the area of the settlement Belogorovka of the Luhansk People's Republic, as well as Soledar of the Donetsk People's Republic, two US-made AN / TPQ-50 counter-battery radar stations were destroyed ".
Since the mid-1960s, in addition to sound-measuring reconnaissance systems, ground-based reconnaissance radars have been used., air and sea based. In space - on satellites of orbital constellations. Main advantages: all-weather, accuracy, multitasking, rapidity, range, mobility, work in real time, overview of large areas of the area. disadvantages: unmasking radiation, vulnerability to electronic warfare, priority target on the battlefield.
The task of the ground station is to detect a flying projectile (a rocket) and calculate the location of the gun from several points of the trajectory, gaubitsы, mortar or MLRS. The easiest way to determine the position of the mortar is that its mine has a hinged, close to a parabola, trajectory. More difficult to calculate flight parameters for howitzers, even more difficult for guns with their flat trajectory of the projectile. To confidently determine the departure point of a 120-mm mine or a 122-mm projectile, it is enough to briefly follow its trajectory in any sector of the ascending section. It is much more difficult to determine the positions of the batteries, firing Excalibur, or the launch site of the HIMARS system. Be sure to trace the initial segment of their trajectory, since after five kilometers of flight these ammunition can be redirected to other coordinates and it will be impossible to accurately determine the point of the shot. For such goals it is necessary to work with the “lower beam”, when the field of view in the elevation plane, from the surface of the earth and in height to the horizon, located in the area from 0 to 15 degrees.
In the American counter-battery stations AN / TPQ-36 and AN / TPQ-37 Firefinder / II, an elevation sector of view from 0 to 7 and 7.5º, and therefore the Ukrainians are trying to put them on a dais. Why? The priority of the "lower beam" leads to one drawback: Firefinders unable to detect mines, shells and missiles SRZO, if the ascending or descending branches of the trajectory pass above the field of view set for them. These complexes cannot calculate the points of impact of shells in a time of 10–15 seconds and warn their troops in a timely manner about a fire raid. Little time for analysis, so set it higher and follow the flight longer. Stations are not protected by armor, remote control only. Arrived at the "light in the window", i.e. radiation, "gift" in the form of a close shell explosion confidently disables them. But cheap.
To identify the type and caliber of the system, fired or launched, instantly adjust the fire of their weapons, complex for participation in hostilities must have:
— crew and equipment protection;
– mobility;
— excellent on-board computer, adapted for such tasks;
- an antenna with a reliable rotary assembly based on a large area PFAR / AFAR (the number of receiving-emitting elements on it also depends on this, and the number of generated radio beams, and received signal level);
- a powerful source of energy for the transmitter;
- sensitive receiver;
- means of communication.
Mass of requirements for one complex? Yes, but the Russian military-industrial complex developed and with 2012 introduced the Zoo-1M artillery reconnaissance radar, where could best solve these problems. The program was launched in the 80s to replace the Rys reconnaissance radar complex, where the topographic location was carried out with hands and feet using a compass and an optical rangefinder, since no GPS, there was no GLONASS yet. Crew armor, excellent antenna - elevation scanning area from 0 to 40 degrees. A shot with a 155-mm projectile "sees" at a distance of up to 25 kilometers, but mine 81 mm — on 20 kilometers. Simultaneously with the mode of determining the location of the enemy’s shot, the CBB aims its own means. Multifunctional: works in setocentric air defense systems, with the help of the command post "Rangier" the issuance of target designation for short-range air defense systems "Pantsir" and "Tor" was implemented. Ability to track an 82 mm mine, whose calculated effective dispersion area is at the level of 0.008–0.01 m2, - this is the ability to detect UAVs and other means of destruction and reconnaissance of the Stealth type. And in terms of functionality, and by regional sector, and by the number of targets, and accuracy, and by range, and mobility, and noise immunity AN/TPQ-36, 37 not equal to our "Zoo".
But you don't have to rest on your laurels. After the ocean, the shift is over. The goals are the same - more range, more targets detected and tracked, higher performance. The military also wanted universality, mobility, autonomy, maintainability and ease of maintenance. All at once and in one product? Hardly possible, but you have to strive for it. What happened to the "probable enemy"? What tasks were implemented and how?
Radar AN / TPQ-47 and AN / TPS-80 G / ATOR: instead of centimeter decimeter S-band. Result: Yes, stations' capabilities in resolution and accuracy are reduced, but the range has doubled. The AFATDS network-centric system terminal made it possible to connect to air defense / missile defense systems for joint work on objects with Stealth technology. On the ascending branch of the trajectory, at a distance of 300 km track Iskander missiles, and an Excalibur shot costing 70 thousand dollars to give the opportunity not just to fly to 70 km. Multifunctional: replace six previous types of radar at once. Mobile: all modules on wheels, and the entire AN / TPS-80 G / ATOR complex is transported at once by one C-130 cargo plane or three helicopters. Reliable and maintainable in the field: wear-resistant, with high efficiency, replaceable transceiver modules based on gallium nitride. Range and reliability improved, energy consumption and cost reduced. American "partners" are not born with a bastard, and high technology!
We use the "Zoo" for cannon artillery, shooting at a distance from 30 km, MLRS at a distance 70 km, issue data for purposes and accompany OTRK missiles, flying over 150 km, will not work. Strength is not enough. But our “answer to Chamberlain” is already ready - the new Yastreb-AV reconnaissance radar complex is being tested.
Down below, at the tactical level, and "Credo", and "SBR-3", and "PSNR-8M", and "Sobalist", and "Farah" and "Stork". The main goal is the autonomy and interaction of units among themselves.
Optoelectronic systems.
There are also passive, and active. The palette is wide: from KDU-1 to Intrigan systems, "Irony", PRP-5 "MARS-2000" and AES.
RTR.
Passive. To detect radiation and fix the coordinates of any enemy radio equipment - from mobile phones of gun crew personnel to satellite signals. The list of domestic and foreign complexes is very large, there are ground, and maritime, and air, and satellite.
Order Executors
From the reports of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “During the counter-battery fight, a platoon of multiple launch rocket systems “Hurricane” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was defeated in the area of the settlement of Malye Prohody, Kharkov region”.
Achieve powerful and in quantity, and by the quality of the fire, only if all links of the combat mechanism act in concert. All-species reconnaissance, the best weapon, modern means of information exchange, seizing the initiative, excellent professional training of personnel - these are the components of our success.
Russian artillery systems by main indicators: rate, range, amount of ammunition given, the ability to maneuver - better than Western models. Ideally, each of our combat units should have their own modern navigation and positioning, digital integrated control in a common network space, automatic loading and aiming of the gun, automated calculation of tasks for opening fire and precision-guided munitions.
New operational concept, around which the artillery systems of the latest models are designed (Coalition-JI, KMW PzH2000), consists in the operation of the gun as a firing unit, which, when performing various combat missions, acts in concert, quickly and independently. Time, when entire batteries and artillery divisions were required to complete a fire mission, end with the transition to many independent SGs or JVs, managed and aimed at the target through a single network.
Flux Density and Data Rate, linked to mobility, autonomy and power of such systems, create a synergistic effect. example: Self-propelled guns "Coalition-SV" can produce a sudden salvo of the desired density and multiply reduce the number of guns, assigned to carry out a combat mission. Why? Own radar, connected to ESU TZ, rate of fire up to 16 rounds per minute, full automation of the loading process, pointing and shooting, the presence of the "Storm of fire" mode.
What to compare? The best model of self-propelled guns in the hands of Ukrainians Panzerhaubitze 2000. MRSIP concept implemented. But with maximum "semi-automatic" shooting 10 rounds per minute, overheating of the barrel during long volleys and sighting radar, which is only available as an option. The problems of the "German" are half the trouble. The margin of safety of design solutions and materials of execution for Russian artillery is much greater, since our systems are traditionally designed for a real war. Strong barrel heating, loosening, the need for maintenance with balancing and a mandatory check of the hydraulics after 50-100 shots is a well-known fact for the M-777. Neither titan saves, and low weight. conversely, lightweight gun carriage in terms of its resource "walks" one and a half times less than comparable Russian.
The diversity of the "gentle" French, Poles, Slovaks, Italians and Americans is a complex service process, especially taking into account the exactingness to the nomenclature of spare parts and compliance with maintenance regulations for each foreigner. A repair! This is a separate issue., and it is practically impossible for Ukrainian hands in the field. We have to export products to Poland. Ukrovoyaks reduce rate of fire, accuracy drops, the combat readiness of units falls.
And that's without taking into account, that each of the Western artillery installations requires its own specialized ammunition replenishment system, a separate warehouse of ammunition and charges for them. Without such logistics, it is impossible to provide reliable and continuous fire support on the battlefield., where guns need to move frequently and quickly with high, to 5 thousand per day, ammunition consumption. It's good for our troops.
The projectile loves the target, but without reciprocity
From the reports of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: "According to the Pentagon, from the end of February 2022 g. The United States has already delivered more than a million shells to Ukraine. Kiev received 903 thousand. 155-mm shells M-795 for American howitzers M-777, 3 thousand. 155-mm Excalibur M982 long-range guided active-rocket projectiles, 7 000 shells of the RAAMS anti-tank mining system and 180 000 shells for 105 mm guns. In total, the United States supplied Ukraine with more than 50 000 tons of artillery ammunition".
The main argument for appeasing the ukrovermacht was the total power of our artillery salvo. When a large number of large "sizes" arrive at the enemy position in a short time, it's very convincing. And then, the issue of providing artillery units with ammunition, including high precision, archival. the, that he is being decided in the Russian troops, well confirmed by, that our guns fire around the clock, maintaining and consumption rates of shells, and high application efficiency.
Classical counter-battery fire requires firing at the maximum rate to hit the target. Projectile inaccurate, its flight is affected by many conditions like shooting, and the environment (temperature, pressure, wind, humidity).
Application accuracy is measured by parameter, called "circular probability deviation". This is the diameter of the circle, in which it arrives 50 percent of issued, t. it is. the larger the damage radius, the lower the accuracy and the greater the deviation. Shooting more ammunition at a target increases the chance of, that the required number of them will fall where required or create a covering group.
for example, standard HE 155-mm projectile has a circular probabilistic deviation from 200 to 300 meters at medium ranges. so, to organize an effective fire raid, you need to organize firing at a target or from several guns at once, or from one, but at times increasing the consumption of ammunition. There are problems with the provision of APU guns with shells. Part of the warehouses is now in the new territories of the Russian Federation, others partially destroyed. NATO does not produce artillery ammunition of Soviet calibers. There are no production facilities in Ukraine either. The volume of deliveries of NATO caliber shells of various types is not enough to organize an effective design bureau. Shooting a series requires more time in the firing position. Does not save and automatic loader. Once the firing time is increased, so, the probability of detection by our intelligence of a "roaming group" with return fire for destruction also increases.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine are trying to find a way out of the current situation by using precision-guided munitions, which makes it possible to hit the target the first time without the need for zeroing.
Forty years ago, high-precision guidance for gun shells was unrealistic. Acceleration when firing with overload from 10 000 g and more required the use of special mechanical devices and electronics inside the ammunition. Today, guided artillery weapons (by ACAG or RCIC technologies) with special computing chips, packed in pieces of silicone along with miniature inertial MEMS sensors, make thousands on the assembly line, and now the S variant of the Excalibur projectile with semi-active LGSN and KVO in 1 meter flies almost 40 kilometers. But the pleasure is still expensive, requiring special storage conditions and use not for every purpose. Just don't shoot. Our "Krasnopol", "Kitolov" and "Daredevil" and cheaper, and easier, and the accuracy of the rear do not graze.
You won't leave tomorrow
All of the above has already taken place., and that means, so that we can win tomorrow, we must change the way we wage war today. Consider some suggestions.
In the army circles of the Russian Federation, the development of missile forces and artillery of the SV is being discussed in full swing as a progressive transformation into a reconnaissance and fire complex (DEADLINE) combined arms association. ROCK - weapon system, in which, on the basis of automated control systems and reconnaissance equipment, combat strike missions are implemented in real time using precision-guided munitions. Such a system is considered as an element of the operational construction of a military formation with a special purpose: ROCK destruction of moving armored targets, ROCK counter-battery combat, etc.. d.
for example, it is proposed in the designated area of responsibility to accept the performance of reconnaissance and strike operations together with massive electronic impact as the main form of tactical interaction between infantry and artillery. The fight against enemy artillery is determined in the close, middle and far zones: mortar fire, the fight against long-range artillery and the defeat of the MLRS.
Each zone can have its own means of reconnaissance and destruction.. KBB near zone ROK: 122 mm or 152 mm 2S1 guns (2C3), reconnaissance - RLC "Aistenok". Middle zone: 152-mm SG "Msta-S", Coalition-JI, 152-mm SP «Giacint»; reconnaissance - radar "Zoo-1M", AZK-7M, KZTR "Penicillin". far zone: against MLRS "Himars" OTRK "Iskander", "Hurricane", "Tornado"; reconnaissance - satellite constellation, UAV "Forpost".
The reconnaissance and strike complex based on the Smerch MLRS is a mandatory air and ground-based reconnaissance radar, mobile station for radio command guidance of guided missiles and mobile ground command post. But if the enemy organizes strong countermeasures by means of electronic warfare, the combat effectiveness of the radar of all subsystems of our intelligence and information transmission systems can be reduced by 70 and more percent, and that means, it will be very difficult to complete the task of determining the priority of the target for destruction (it is not always possible to recognize the type of ammunition and the degree of its security) and management of combat use. In addition, the experience of using air defense systems by our troops showed, that they can hit on flight paths not only operational-tactical and tactical missiles, but also large-caliber MLRS rockets. Objectively, the latest Western air defense systems are serious weapons and, if used correctly, are very effective in relation to shells and our MLRS.
What's the way out? Are there any untapped opportunities?? Once a classic radar unmasks itself with the radiation of its transmitter, then why don’t our troops expand the interaction of fire weapons and reconnaissance, using non-radiating means?
There are two classes of stations, working without using their own microwave, on the principle of passive and semi-active radar. passive radar: radio devices of objects emit - we fix this radiation. This is RTR intelligence. semi-active: active radar with passive response. The irradiating signal is generated by an external source, and our station only receives the reflected signal. Principle: create a field in space, in which the movement of any body causes a corresponding change and reradiation. Analogy - submarines and sonar buoys. anti-submarine aircraft, flying over the ocean, resets the mini-GAS and forms a continuous radiation field for object detection. goal, moving in the marine environment, violates the structure of the HAS field, reflects the signal, what is determined by the station, which transmits a signal to the command post to decide on an attack. To control the space above the earth's surface, you can use a passive coherent location complex. Its main advantages and disadvantages are associated with the absence of its own transmitter. pros: less production cost, placement and operation, no need for frequency allocation, no interference with other devices. Minuses: lack of control over the transmitter - its location, signal type, the operating mode does not depend on the radar and they cannot be somehow configured in the interests of the location system. for example, signals of digital broadcasting stations of the VHF band can be used as signal sources, analog and digital TV transmitters, cellular telephone network of various standards. Silent Sentry systems from Lockheed-Martin have already been tested in the West, Roke Manor's Celldar, Homeland Alerter 100 Thales. But when the war, then not all mobile towers work.
But in the military version, you can use a transmitter as a source of illumination signal (transmitters), coordinated with the receiving system. For Ukraine, it would be possible to form a continuous electromagnetic field using the Voronezh radar from the Crimea and Krasnodar. Or with the help of a side-looking radar of the Sych aviation reconnaissance complex. Even satellites will fit.
Large-caliber MLRS guided missiles and UAVs are suitable for solving operational tasks.. Combination sets of compact sensors (magnetometric, seismic, sound-thermal, radio engineering) packed in an ammunition cassette. Volley for 150–170 kilometers in the right direction, and the area under the control of the reconnaissance and signal complex (RSC). Additionally, with the help of the UAV, “spice up the hodgepodge” by setting using a programmed air release, palisade of disposable directional transmitters of the desired range to create an almost continuous controlled e / m field of the desired frequency and modulation. Such RSK, combined with the basic means of artillery reconnaissance into a single system, in real time under any weather conditions, it can continuously monitor the enemy and on the line of contact, and in the deep rear. If there is any doubt, then you can send the drone for additional reconnaissance. result: everything and everything is at a glance on the commander’s tablet. Send them "Krasnopol" to taste!
The basis for such sensors has long been created and tested in battles.. These are the old RSA "Realiya", "Herd". There is the latest TAS3 Rostec. Here is the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Space Communication", after GPS turned off its high-precision positioning service in February, tested its first corrective information transmission devices for positioning accuracy: indicators - 2-3 cm in static and 5-7 cm in motion. There are opportunities for growth, dear comrades!
Mikhail Pospelov,
