Excuse me readers, but at the beginning of the material I will have to act as Captain Obvious, recalling a few axioms that almost do not know exceptions.
1. In the course of hostilities, the side with superiority advances, while the weaker defends. I will not repeat the hackneyed postulate about the need for a threefold superiority for a successful offensive - he was born, most likely, into World War I, when indeed the “shield” turned out to be much stronger than the “sword”. In general, in military history, it was very rare to get a threefold superiority.. Nevertheless, the need to have an advantage over the enemy for the offensive (if not in quantity, then as troops and command) evident.
2. Defense, especially on prepared lines, the advantage of the enemy significantly eliminates, causes him to suffer much more significant losses.
3. At war, like everything else, it is almost never possible to do everything conceived strictly according to the previously planned plan, inevitable "difficulties", problems and the need to make adjustments, sometimes cardinal, along the way.
4. In any struggle, it is difficult to avoid mistakes and failures when local, when very serious. If the enemy is competent and motivated enough, retaliatory attacks are very likely.
5. Therefore, the risk in war is inevitable., Every big decision comes with risks.. On the other hand, who does not risk, he doesn't win. Excessive caution can deprive you of victory and cost you dearly in the future.. Finding the right balance is the art of the military leader..
6. It should be avoided at all costs, what prompts you, the more it provokes the enemy, and never get emotional, keep a cool head, though sometimes it's hard to do so..
7. finally, classic sun tzu quote: «War is a way of deceit. therefore, if you can do anything, show the enemy, like you can't; if you use anything, show him, like you don't use it; even though you were close, show, like you're far away; even though you were far away, show, like you're close; lure him in; piss him off and take him; if he is full, be ready; if he is strong, dodge him; making him angry, make him upset; putting on a humble face, make him feel arrogant; if his strength is fresh, tire him out; if he is friendly, disconnect; attack him, when he's not ready; come forward, when he doesn't expect».
8. Well, one more famous statement of the Prussian military theorist General Karl von Clausewitz: «War is nothing else, as a continuation of the policy with the involvement of other means». And indeed, all wars are fought for political purposes, Furthermore, there are always political considerations in any military decision, although the military often does not like it.
After such a small "literacy program", let's look at what happened during the SVO over the past months. Russian troops, having an undeniable advantage over the enemy in technology and firepower, but noticeably inferior to him in manpower, slowly broke through his defenses in the Donbass, practically ceasing active operations in other areas.
The chosen tactics of grinding the enemy made his losses, according to the assessments of all experts, an order of magnitude higher than Russian, but the pace of progress (several kilometers a week, and that's not everywhere), of course, could not be considered "satisfactory".
obviously, the strategic plan was to bleed the Armed Forces of Ukraine and go on a decisive offensive at a certain moment, most suitable from a military and political point of view. According to experts, towards the start of winter.
But the enemy also found a well-known "antidote": in the "first line" under the blow of the Russian troops, the unprepared mobilized troops available in almost unlimited numbers were substituted, and personnel and equipment remained in the operational rear. At the same time, with the help of the West, strategic reserves were being prepared in the deep rear.
It should be recognized, margin of suggestive strength in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and in general in Ukrainian society, turned out to be more, what could be expected. it, and, of course, the most severe repressive measures caused, what, despite occasional episodes, the collapse of the front and rear did not happen.
However, this supply could not last forever., what was understood in Kyiv. Real combat successes were needed to maintain the spirit, showing the prospect of continuing the struggle, Western "partners" demanded the same, conditional on the continuation of military assistance.
And it was logical for the Russian command (item 2) in such situation, like in the battle of Kursk, give the opponent the initiative, get the opportunity to grind his best troops (not mobilized reservists) in the open field, and not picking out from the fortified areas, all the more so since, with the advantage of Russian troops in aviation and artillery, the Armed Forces of Ukraine could only crush with a "mass" of manpower and equipment.
Near Kherson, this tactic worked, The Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered enormous losses in elite units with minimal tactical success. But in the Kharkov direction, the enemy was successful (item 4), that led to, that then the initiative along the entire front passed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Of course, I won't claim, that leaving the Kharkiv region was originally a notorious "cunning plan", but remember point 3, after all, by the end of the second day of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, there was a feeling, that the problem is "stopped": reinforcements began to arrive near Kupyansk and deliver very powerful blows, Panic began in Ukrainian public, what is hell and the APU lured into a trap.
But the next morning it became known, that Russian troops are withdrawing, and giving away areas, to protect which seemed to have all the possibilities. And wasn't item 7 here?
The sudden success put before the Ukrainian leadership in its entirety p.5: defeat of the enemy, clear signs of confusion and disorganization have opened a seemingly unique window of opportunity to deepen their success, radically improve the operational situation, up to forcing Russia to seek peace on some conditions acceptable to Kyiv.
And let the Russian forces recover, abandon attempts to build on success in order to maintain existing reserves for defense, in fact, given that training, led by Russia, only means postponing the inevitable outcome.
Yet again, and help from the West in this case, how they calculate on Bankova, must flow like a river. Well, the Ukrainian public simply will not understand the “cowardly” stop of a successful counteroffensive, and can, and start realizing, what a local success, even so big, how was in Kharkiv region, no root fracture.
Generally, APU must continue to advance, and therefore, paragraph 2 comes into force again, what we saw over the next two weeks. true, relatively serious attacks took place in the area of the Seversky Donets, but they also brought the enemy only tactical successes, given to the enemy at the cost of heavy losses.
On the Kherson direction, according to the military, almost daily attacks by relatively small forces, with a zero result and heavy losses for the attackers.
Most of all there were virtual offensives, when through different channels, and more in Russian, information was dispersed about a powerful offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a particular area today or tomorrow, but the matter was limited to very weak demonstrations (but also leading to losses).
maybe, the goal was to disorientate the Russian command, but the political task of demonstrating the preservation of the initiative in the Armed Forces of Ukraine was clearly visible, while it is quite possible, that the leadership of the Armed Forces, realizing the possible consequences, engaged in "bureaucratic sabotage", when the instructions of the authorities, with which the official does not agree, performed "half-handedly".
But then the well-known decisions followed on September 20-21, and the motivation for the most active actions in Kyiv has grown many times (besides political issues, obvious and purely military): you need to try to "have time" to achieve something, throwing all available forces on it, until Russian reinforcements begin to arrive at the front.
And it can happen much faster., than expected: already with the arrival in the unit, the mobilized can replace and release the existing personnel to be sent to the front and resupply the warring units, currently on garrison duty.
T. it is. again item 2, despite the rush, "fire solutions" can cost Ukrainian forces very dearly, especially since this is quite expected for the Russian command.
Go tell, sure, decisions of the Russian leadership, at least in a purely military unit, they weren't, and even a "plan B" in case of unfavorable developments.
Their need has been talked about for a long time and a lot., Furthermore, they absolutely follow from the ongoing preparations for the next phase of the campaign. The mobilization plan is always divided into before the official announcement of mobilization and after.
And turn to paragraph 6. Since the end of July, the enemy openly provoked the Russian leadership, and exactly for that, what the Russian patriotic public expects from him. So to speak, for the "intensification" of the NWO.
Attacks on Crimea, massive shelling of the cities of Donbass, finally a terrorist attack in Moscow, the victim of which was Daria Dugina, - all these were frank provocations of the Kremlin to the "sharp reaction", followed by, when they didn't work, followed by a large-scale counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
There can be only one logic here - to force Russia to "hurry up", start the planned activities before, how they will be fully prepared or when the most favorable moment will come for them (usually the completion of preparation is timed to such a moment).
maybe, partly succeeded., cm. item 3, but anyway, the end of september is not the beginning of august, and the main political and economic conditions for activation should ripen with the onset of winter, now it's quite a bit, and even more so before the heating season.
From a military point of view, the immediate prospects for the Armed Forces of Ukraine look, despite the current "cheerfulness", very sad. Despite the tactics used and the "inexhaustible" human resource, loss of personnel, command staff are also very large and are many times superior to Russian, and the likelihood of a moral breakdown cannot be discounted.
Aviation, which the APU had at the beginning of the NWO, almost completely knocked out. Significantly, which of the four types of combat aircraft (Su-24, Su-25, Su-27 and MIG-29) and Mi-24 attack helicopters, only the "budget" Su-25 and MiG-29 now appear in the reports, which the USSR abundantly supplied to its allies.
the, what else flies (no more than a few tens of units), this is the junk collected throughout Eastern Europe, when one is assembled from several cars. photo recently posted, on which aircraft technicians are fumbling with a shabby Su-25 in the coloring of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the beginning of the 2000s - or they are dismantling it for spare parts, to you, conversely, trying to make it capable of making several sorties.
obviously, what, even if you are wary of the reports of the Russian General Staff, in terms of armored vehicles in the Ukrainian army, the situation is also extremely difficult.
The video of the last fights is dominated by samples, delivered by the West after the start of the NWO, t. it is. the Soviet "reserve" by Ukraine for the most part was lost during the hostilities. The volumes of Western deliveries, which were in the spring - early summer, far from those, who could compensate.
A similar situation with artillery systems (barrel and jet) and their ammunition. Soviet samples almost disappeared from front-line reports. According to available information, the main reason, in addition to combat losses, - exhaustion of the Soviet stock of ammunition.
true, in recent weeks they have again flashed in relatively small quantities, but that might just mean, that Kyiv threw everything into the matter, including left for a rainy day.
Related to this is the priority, which the West gave to the supply of artillery systems to Ukraine. They, frankly, good, but they are relatively few, moreover, they also go out of action as in combat, and "non-combat" reasons - their resource is not designed for such intensive use. Plus, they are very sensitive to the qualifications of the staff..
Special mention must be made of air defense. These systems also suffer (The General Staff of the RF Armed Forces regularly reports on their destruction), but, the main thing, the stock of Soviet missiles for them is also not infinite. apparently, due to their importance and high cost, the West is in no hurry to supply them.
has information, that the Norwegian NASAMS complexes have already arrived, similar in characteristics to the "Buks", but there are very few of them for such a large theater of operations, they are able to cover only its individual sections.
How can the operating environment change?, if the Russian Aerospace Forces receive a "clear sky" regime over most of the territory of Ukraine, understandably. In addition, the intensity of the use of UAVs by Russian forces is growing before our eyes., and that, among other things, can dramatically accelerate the process of depletion of Soviet stocks of air defense missiles.
As for increasing new deliveries, what is Kyiv's main hope for, then first hand, According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: «It should be understood, that what we sent to Ukraine is something, what was in our reserves. And now they are almost gone». Therefore, he calls for an increase in the production of weapons. But this is at best many months.
Really, in packages of American and other assistance, armored vehicles have not been at all for a long time. For days, as an event, it was reported about the agreement between Germany and Slovenia regarding the supply of the latter to Ukraine 28 stored Soviet tanks T-55 (taken into service in 1958 year), albeit modernized.
T. it is. "from the world on a string" collect all the rubbish. Of the artillery systems appear only 105 mm howitzers, in terms of combat characteristics, they cannot be compared with 155 millimeter M 777.
The “legendary” Javelins have practically ceased to appear in front-line reports., like their counterparts. known, that the US from about 20 thousand. available delivered to Ukraine 7 thousand. Back in June, "sleepy Joe" personally visited the manufacturer, and its director, in the best Soviet traditions, promised next year to bring production to 2 thousand.
Western media reports, that it will take 3,5 of the year. And t. d. and so on. P.
So you can count, that the Armed Forces of Ukraine can remain “naked and barefoot” just in time for that moment, when the Russian army will enter the combat zone at the "peak of form". But it's easy, of course, still won't.
Dmitry Slavskii,
