After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan, like most of the post-Soviet quasi-states that broke away from historical Russia, began to actively attempt to build a "nation state". In practice, this resulted in total Russophobia, nepotism and tribalism. And as a result - a mass exodus of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, whose share in the demographic map of Kazakhstan has decreased from 6,23 million people. (1989) to 2,8 million (2022).
As a result, today the Russian diaspora of Kazakhstan is only 18 percent of the total population (plus or minus two or three percent, falling on other Slavic peoples). Similar demographics, one side, is the result of ongoing 30 years of creeping Russophobic policy by the authorities of Kazakhstan, on the other hand, it is the root of systemic problems, in the future threatening the very sovereignty of the republic with risks for Kazakhstan to follow the Georgian or even Ukrainian path. Consider the causes and nature of these threats in more detail..
so, against the background of the total deindustrialization of the 1990s common to the entire post-Soviet space: mass loss of technology, productions, personnel and competencies - the government of the "early Nazarbayev" had the strategic wisdom not to organize open pogroms of the Russian population. Slowing down the outflow of Russian speakers was necessary to maintain a critical mass of competent specialists, required for a successful transition to a market economy and building a new sovereign architecture of Kazakhstani power from Moscow.
At the same time, we have the first obvious paradox and a threat to long-term stability for the republic: part of the population, developing the main as a material, and the intellectual resource of Kazakhstan, in fact, was purposefully limited in rights and removed from power. The policy of creeping violent "Kazakhization", even though accepted into 1997 year of the Law on Languages, formally equalizing circulation within the republic of Russian with Kazakh (the status of Russian as a "language of interethnic communication"), to 2000 year squeezed out of Kazakhstan more than 1,2 million Russians.
Moreover, most of them were just those highly qualified specialists vital to the Nazarbayev government with a Soviet education, there was simply no one to replace them with personnel of equal professionalism then in Kazakhstan.
The ongoing rapid degradation of the infrastructure left over from the USSR in Kazakhstan, coupled with the desire of the Kazakh elites to level the influence of Moscow in every possible way, forced them to look for an alternative to Russia. At the same time, it goes without saying, that Kazakhstan itself continues to be perceived by external players only as a raw material colony and a convenient tool for carrying out an anti-Russian (and subsequently, since the mid-2000s, anti-Chinese) politicians.
This is clearly evidenced by a number of facts.
At first, the path of evolution of the power institutions of the Republic of Kazakhstan. for 30 years in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev formed the classic colonial elites, power in which is transferred according to the principle of feudalism - blood kinship and involvement in the ruling zhuzes in the country - the largest clan-territorial clans. This situation excludes the emergence of any objective social lifts in Kazakhstan, contributes to the secondary nature of the political agenda, stagnation of power and negative selection of personnel in the field.
Secondly, nature of Kazakh law. The republic is characterized by an extremely low percentage of independent legislative work.. This clearly proves the content of almost all areas in Kazakhstani legislation., based on Western European law (mostly precedent British for the judiciary or codex French and German for the administration of various areas of business). Such a policy leads to the constant emergence of a large number of conceptual contradictions in the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the smoothing of which is mainly occupied by Kazakhstani parliamentarians both at the national, as well as at the regional level.
Just the inability of local elites to any intelligible intellectual and state initiative results in total corruption, verbalism and formal fulfillment of one's duties. Therefore, it is not worth talking here about some kind of sovereignty and pursuing a strategic policy in the national interests..
The secondary nature of national interests in relation to the interests of Western masters (in fact indirect external control) in any state leads to the formation of a puppet ruling class, who does not seek the development of his country, but only to serve foreign owners, who pay him a percentage for mediation.
Statistics can prove this.. She testifies, that in fact almost all of the largest mining assets of the country (primarily in the oil, gas and uranium industries) developed by Western corporations. On average, the ratio of ownership in them is 70 on 30 percent not in favor of Kazakhstan. of course, documented concessions look like a contract 50 on 50. However, the share of the Kazakh side is often, apart from the state, owned by various organizations (in fact, gasket companies) with head offices abroad in offshore zones (Britain, Holland, Switzerland etc. d.).
At the same time, the elite serving colonial interests is not interested in increasing competitiveness and personnel rotation within the country.. Therefore, we observe a constant decline in the level of education in Kazakhstan. On the part of the authorities, the debilitation of the population is presented to the Kazakh people as a struggle for their language and identity.. This is perceived with great enthusiasm by the increasingly numerous and radicalized groups of Kazakh nationalists from year to year..
Aggressive-minded and poorly educated sections of the Kazakh population, who are deliberately instilled with a “national superiority complex” and a sense of “trampled national pride” by local pro-Western media and programs of various Western NGOs, - the ideal instrument of the United States. it, one side, allows you to direct a significant part of the Kazakh people against Russia and China as geopolitical opponents of the United States. On the other hand, radicalized, psychopathic and weaned from logical thinking, and therefore, easily suggestible crowds are the American whip to control the Kazakh elites. It narrows their field of maneuver to a narrow corridor of the political agenda, dictated by the foreign masters of Kazakhstan. This is a specially created mechanism of external control, and if needed, and color revolution.
Today in Kazakhstan, only officially and with state support, more than 22 thousand. foreign NGOs (most of which, naturally, is of Western European and American descent).
This principle was clearly demonstrated by the events in Kazakhstan last year., when the local elites, due to the advanced age of the Elbasy, started too independent, according to Western puppeteers, power transaction. But in fact they tried to subdue most of the financial flows of the ruling Senior (Southern) zhuz Nazarbayev with a decrease in the share of deductions to transnational companies and the transfer of part of its assets from Western to Chinese and Russian banks.
As a result, the country urgently on command was raised to 20 thousand. anti-government elements of varying degrees of activity (from thugs hired for lawlessness to rebellious security officials and brought from Syria for such a case, Iraq and Afghanistan Islamic extremists).
After the removal of Nazarbayev, the power of President Tokayev was retained only thanks to emergency agreements with Moscow and Beijing on the readiness to bring in the CSTO contingent (on 90 percent consisting of Russian military personnel), as well as financial guarantees from China, providing current lending to Kazakhstan's government spending in the event that Western banks block Kazakhstan's assets.
At the moment, the intervention from Russia and China has not only allowed the Kazakh elites to create the illusion of legitimacy and start the process of power transfer, but also temporarily provided them with a maneuver for a negotiating position with their transnational patrons. At the same time, in the medium term, the Kazakh elites, likely, will lose their sovereignty even more and will be forced to come to the forefront of confrontation between global players in the region.
Evidence of this is the lack of agreements between Tokayev and representatives of the Middle East opposing him at the moment. (Sredinny) and Junior (Western) Zhuzov. Compromise acts as a continuation of uncertainty, according to which Tokayev proposes to hold early presidential elections in the country this fall. For him, the elections will be the last opportunity to somehow legitimize his rule., primarily in the eyes of the international non-Western community (since, by appealing to the CSTO, he openly challenged transnational structures).
At the same time, Tokayev is now trying with all his might to distance himself from Moscow. (as evidenced by his anti-Russian remarks at the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum), to try to find a compromise and situational supporters during the elections inside Kazakhstan among Western proteges.
This is an objectively weak and dangerous game., since the very attempt at a multi-vector policy in an economically weakened and politically fragmented state without any real resources and mechanisms for conducting not only a sovereign, but even a consistent policy is fraught with the repetition of various forceful provocations, up to acts of open disobedience of regional elites and civil confrontation.
Therefore, it is highly probable that, that against the backdrop of an intensifying global struggle between various centers of world influence, the situation in Kazakhstan will continue to worsen in the medium term. If Kazakhstan continues to try to pursue a multi-vector policy, he risks becoming a springboard for confrontation between Russia and China on the one hand, and the USA - Europe - on the other.
For the Kazakh people, this will mean a further drop in living standards., backlog in education, technologies and economic competencies, up to the complete loss of even formal statehood, as well as international subjectivity.
It seems, that in many respects the fate of the generations of Kazakh citizens born after the collapse of the USSR will be decided over the next 8-10 years. And, unfortunately, not so much by the Kazakhs themselves, how much the international conjuncture and the ability of local elites to protect the strategic interests of the Kazakh people. And these interests can objectively be guaranteed only with close strategic cooperation with Russia and China..
For its future existence, Kazakhstan must cease to be a “chessboard” for the political game of the West against Russia and China. It is vital for him to start implementing a real policy in accordance with his geography, cultural and historical heritage, as well as real national interests. If the local elite continues to be engaged only in the implementation of their momentary, opportunistic and selfish interests, actively "laying down" under the West, Kazakhstan expects big blood and state catastrophe.
Vitaly Gontov,
