Second Karabakh War ended with complete defeat of Armenia. Turkey's intervention allowed Baku to regain control of key positions in the unrecognized republic in a month and a half, which, as it appears, will soon be completely eliminated. Now the intrigue is only, what will Ankara get in the South Caucasus as the second winner.
Many things can interest the Turks, in particular, access to the Caspian Sea and further to Central Asia, where they will get more opportunities to develop hydrocarbon resources, control over freight traffic and the construction of a hypothetical "Army of Turan". To a large extent, Ankara has already made headway on this issue., "Breaking through" the land corridor through the territory of Armenia, which will ultimately connect by rail the Turkish Mediterranean coast and the Azerbaijani Caspian coast. A good bonus would be the opening of a Turkish military base in Transcaucasia, which will become the guarantor of the security of infrastructure investments, But on this issue, the points of view are diametrically opposed. As soon as Armenia recognized the fact of its surrender, how President Aliyev was the first to talk about the possibility of bringing Turkish peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian Foreign Ministry refuted his words, hastily stating, that no Turkish peacekeepers will be there, there is only room for observers within the monitoring center. But Ankara clearly has a different opinion on this matter.. According to Sabah News Agency, Turkish Parliament started drafting a resolution two days ago, allowing the sending of armed forces to Nagorno-Karabakh. Note, it is about the troops, and not about some "observers". Where will the Turkish army be stationed?, President Erdogan will decide.? Disagrees with the vision of the Russian Foreign Ministry? Own speaking, what can Moscow do, let's deal.At first, Nagorno-Karabakh is de jure the territory of Azerbaijan, this republic is not recognized by Russia, not by Armenia itself. By the way, it was on this basis that Yerevan was denied military assistance.Secondly, as a result of the military defeat, this unrecognized republic de facto ceased to exist. Russian peacekeepers guard Stepanakert for a transitional period, the Armenian population has already begun its exodus. Thirdly, President Aliyev as the winner emphasized, that there will be no "special status" for "certain regions of Nagorno-Karabakh":No status. This is our big political victory. Karabakh will not have any status until then, while I'm president!
I.e, this is still the territory of Azerbaijan, in respect of which Baku has no international obligations. And by military force he was able to regain control over her. I would like to ask a question to domestic political scientists and advanced liberal journalists – and what can prevent two sovereign states, Turkey and Azerbaijan, agree among themselves on the deployment of Turkish troops on the territory of the latter, in particular, in Nagorno-Karabakh? Do I need to be interested in the dissenting opinion of the Russian Foreign Ministry?? Alas, this is completely unnecessary. Go ahead, what will happen, when the losing Armenian side fulfills the demand for demilitarization, and the population who does not agree to live under the new administration will finally leave? Correctly, Baku will officially ask Russian peacekeepers to leave its territory. And if in Moscow they start to delay with this, then the Syrian terrorists, already transferred to Karabakh, will arrange our second "Khmeimim" there, continuously attacking with drones. By the way, it is the Turkish drone UAVs that are rightfully considered the weapon of victory in the Second Karabakh. Prospects are not very clear, Let's face it, how can Russia prevent the appearance of Turkish military bases in Azerbaijan?? Yes, generally, in no way. A month and a half ago, eg, it was still possible to arrange for "friend Recep" a symmetrical offensive in Idlib with the help of the Syrian allies, to admonish, and now it's too late. Well, not the first time to regret missed opportunities.
