The subject of heated discussions in the Western and Russian military-analytical communities was the recent information about the successful use of the UAV-kamikaze of the Samad-1/3 family (a, perhaps, and tactical cruise missiles "Quds") against at least two M903 launchers of the Arabian Patriot PAC-3 anti-aircraft missile system, covering the fortified areas of the Saudi Arabian ground forces and Sudanese mercenary paramilitaries in the border province of Marib (near the line of contact between the forces of the "Arabian coalition" and military units of the Yemeni Houthi rebels).
The whole piquancy of what happened lies not so much in the fact, that this "surprise" was presented by the missile units of the Ansar Alla group precisely 4 July 2019 of the year (during the celebration of the Independence Day of the United States), how much in the absence of any information about bringing the battery of the Patriot air defense system to full combat readiness, providing for the azimuth adjustment of inclined M903 launchers in the direction of approaching air attack weapons, in our case, Samad kamikaze drones or Quds tactical missiles. This was reported by the news agencies "Free News", "Al-Masdar News" and "Military-Industrial Courier" citing informed sources in the operational headquarters of "Ansar Allah" and the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces.
The reasons for the "silence" of the Arabian "Patriot" - in the technological "oakness" of the AN / MPQ-53/65 radars
Based on the above circumstance, several fundamental and interesting conclusions can be drawn at once., capable of doing excellent service to specialists of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the command of the Iranian Armed Forces in the development of various methods of suppressing air defense systems of the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 families. Given the extremely complex and almost unpredictable operational and tactical situation in the Yemeni theater of operations, caused by sudden and high-intensity rocket and artillery duels between the Houthis and the forces of the "Arabian coalition", easy to assume, that the multifunctional detection radar, illumination and guidance AN/MPQ-53/65, part of the hit Patriot, with the maximum degree of probability was in standby mode. Consequently, an overview of the airspace over Yemen was to be carried out in the most missile-prone direction (for the appearance of operational-tactical ballistic missiles 8K14 of the Elbrus complex, 9M79 «Point», "Badr-1P" and various types of cruise missiles and UAVs) in the azimuth sector from +45° to -45° (view area 90 degrees), in the elevation plane - from 1 to 73 degrees.
At first sight, taking into account the knowledge of the Arabian calculation of "Patriot PAC-3" about the alleged flight paths of the Yemeni brigade and cruise missiles, the above overview parameters MRLS AN / MPQ-53 (or its more modern modification AN / MPQ-65) should have been more than enough to effectively scan a given section of airspace and "stop" any missile strikes from the Houthis; especially since the ammunition of the PAC-3 complexes boasts the presence of MIM-104F PAC-3MSE anti-missiles with the possibility of over-the-horizon engagement of low-altitude low-observable targets by target designation from E-3A AWACS aircraft, in service with the Royal Saudi Air Force. Nevertheless, virtuosos from the Ansar Alla missile units nevertheless probed the technological shortcomings of the AN / MPQ-53/65 family radars and their modes of operation, after which the myth of PR people from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon about the highest level of survivability of the PAC-3 during intense massive enemy missile strikes was smashed to smithereens. What disadvantages can be?
First of all, this is a rather large restriction on the minimum height of targets tracked and "captured" by AN / MPQ-53/65 radars, component 0,03 km (30 m), while the 30N6E and 9S36 illumination and guidance radars of the S-300PM1 and Buk-M2 complexes operate on ultra-low-altitude objects, operating at altitudes of 10-15 m! This shortcoming is a kind of "genetic disease" of stations of the MPQ-53 family, associated with the minimum beam elevation angle in 1 degrees, while the elevation scanning zone of other modern MRLS begins with or with 0 degrees, or from negative indicators (-4-7 degrees): a striking example of this is the 96L6 all-altitude detector and the Podlyot-K1 low-altitude detector., attached to the S-400 Triumph complexes. Consequently, Houthi drones and cruise missiles “stalking” at a height of 15-20 m could “bypass” the MPQ-53 elevation field of view. The situation could have been saved by RLDN E-3A "Sentry" aircraft, which would give the calculation of the "Patriot" target designation through the channel "Link-16", but at that moment, apparently, not a single vehicle was on combat duty.
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Secondly, this is the probability that the Arabian calculation of the "Patriot" will use the "sector search" mode for targets, when the scanning beam of the passive HEADLIGHT MPQ-53/65, managed 5161 ferrite phase shifters, processes only the most priority and missile-hazardous sectors (manually selected by operators, according to the tactical situation) of the 32 provided by the software of the MPQ-53 radar and the AN / MSQ-132 combat control center. Such a regime could have been chosen by the Saudis to work exclusively on Ansar Alla ballistic missiles., descending branches of the trajectories of which differ in huge angles, while the low-altitude section turned out to be absolutely "unobservable".
finally, third, this is the inability of the AN / MPQ-53/65 radar to operate in the mode of an all-angle radar detector (with 360-degree space coverage in the azimuthal plane and a high frequency of updating information about the air situation due to the rotation of the antenna post ), what modern Arabel-type radars are capable of (are part of the SAMP-T air defense system) or 50H6, attached to the domestic air defense systems of the new generation S-350 "Vityaz". Consequently, the absence of an additional radar detector in the Patriot PAC-3 battery (for example, mobile American radar AN / TPS-75 "Tipsy") provided the command of the Ansar Alla missile brigades with an unplowed field for activities in terms of building complex flight trajectories for the Samad UAV and Quds cruise missiles, followed by access to the side hemispheres of the AN / MPQ-65 radar (with angles of approach more than 45 degrees), which are no longer within the station's field of view; the result is obvious.
Eugene Damantsev
