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the fire, Pain and Valor of Afghanistan

the fire, Pain and Valor of Afghanistan

Burned fuel trucks on one of the roads in Afghanistan. Photo © RIA Novosti

In March 1979 years a mutiny broke out in Herat, a conspiracy in the Jalalabad garrison was exposed. Massive armed uprisings erupted in Paktika provinces in May, Ghazni, Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunar, Balkh, Kabul. They were suppressed. At the same time, during the insurrection in Herat, the first request of the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed.. But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan, established in 1978 year, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the mutiny in Herat forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border., and by order of the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F.. Ustinov began preparations for the entry of troops. The number of Soviet advisers was dramatically increased (including military) in Afghanistan: from 409 people in January to 4,5 thousand. by the end of June 1979 of the year.

By November 1979 a dramatic military-political situation developed in Afghanistan: terror raged, the country actually started a civil war. According to the memoir of former CIA Director Robert Gates, already 3 July 1979 of the year President Jimmy Carter signed a secret decree, authorizing the funding of anti-government forces in Afghanistan.

The well-known statement of Zbigniew Brzezinski, then National Security Advisor to President Carter, in an interview 1998 of the year for the French magazine Nouvel Observateur: “We did not push the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the probability, that they will do it ... "

Brzezinski is credited with the phrase: "Now we have a chance to give the Soviet Union our Vietnam war.". He directly stated that, that the CIA trained the Afghan mujahideen and that he played a key role in resolving this issue.

Later in an interview with American Interest in May 2008 Brzezinski said: “I do not regret at all, that the Soviet Union collapsed, and one of the reasons for its disintegration was that, what have we done in Afghanistan. I would not hesitate to do it again. ". In his opinion, if we put on the scales the existence of the USSR and the emergence of Islamic extremism, the benefits of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the United States were greater, than harm from terrorist attacks by Islamists.

In private, Brzezinski also spoke, that he wanted not only to "compensate" for the losses and damage to the United States in the Vietnam War, but also to distract the Soviet leadership from the events in Poland, where the Solidarity movement was gaining momentum at that time.

The decision to bring in troops was made at a meeting of the Politburo 12 December 1979 of the year. The participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan was not provided for, the procedure for the use of weapons, even for self-defense purposes, has not been determined. true, already 27 December, D.F.. Ustinov on the suppression of the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. anticipated, that Soviet troops will become garrisons and take under protection important industrial and other facilities, thus freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition units, as well as against possible external interference.

However, already in January 1980 years, Soviet troops began to participate in hostilities in the suppression of insurgencies in the Afghan army in Baghlan province and in Kabul. The first casualties appeared among the Soviet military. At the same time, the directive of the Minister of Defense Ustinov on the planning and beginning of hostilities - raids against rebel units in the northern regions of Afghanistan, adjacent to the Soviet border, forces of a no less reinforced battalion and the use of army firepower, including Air Force, to suppress resistance.

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BEAR TRAP

One day a bear went

Look over the mountain,

Look over the mountain,

And nothing more.

And what did the bear see there,

But I saw a bear there

The other side of the mountain,

That's all.

These are lines from an English nursery rhyme.. Lester Grau - renowned expert on the Soviet and Russian army, an employee of the Center for the Study of Foreign Armies at the US Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth took the words of this nursery rhyme as the basis for the titles of his well-known and sensational works on the Afghan war: “Once a bear went over the mountain. Soviet tactics of hostilities in Afghanistan ". (The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) and “The other side of the mountain: tactics of the mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war " (The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, will: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999).

The first book became a sensation and was a translation of a thematic collection of tactical examples from the war in Afghanistan., published at the Military Academy named after. MV. Frunze in 1991 year, with comments from Grau himself. The second book was co-authored with Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former colonel in the Afghan army and minister of the interior in the government of Hamid Karzai..

So what did I see, according to Grau, Soviet Bear, crossing the mountains and ending up in Afghanistan?

First and foremost, its power is not omnipotent., and the adopted tactics are unsuitable for Afghan conditions. The Soviet leadership assessed its chances of success based on the experience of events in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. And only a few in the West doubted, that the Soviets will eventually win. A large number of strategic experts and military planners assumed, that in the future the USSR will come out through southern Afghanistan to the shores of the Persian Gulf, to challenge the strategic interests of the West and disrupt the West's access to critical Middle East oil. The outcome of the Afghan war was all the more interesting for American planners, survivors of the trauma of the Vietnam War.

However, it soon became clear, that Soviet troops faced the same problem in Afghanistan, as the British during the three Anglo-Afghan wars, - a general uprising of the population. At the same time, neither the economic, neither financial, no military aid counted, Afghans, although they accepted it, but still opposed the presence of foreign troops and fought against them under the banner of religious jihad.

The size of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) did not allow to establish control over the entire territory of Afghanistan (true, the American 500-thousandth contingent was also unable to control the entire territory of southern Vietnam, whose territory was in 5 times less than Afghan). The Soviet command with difficulty worked out the tactics of hostilities in relation to Afghan conditions, moreover, from the point of view of weapons, the USSR at that time lagged behind the West in the development of high-tech and high-precision systems.

The initial attempts of the Soviet command to carry out offensive operations according to the rules of a classic war did not bring success.. Raid actions as part of reinforced battalions also proved to be ineffective.. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and the mujahideen, who knew the area perfectly, small groups got out of the blow and broke away from the pursuit, using including underground communications, so-called qanats.

American experts nevertheless admit, that the Soviet military changed the old concept of strategic offensive in the theater of operations (TVD); developed new concepts of shallower separation at all levels, air echelon concept; experimented with new organizational structures, such as corps, brigade and reinforced battalion; experienced new, more flexible logistics concepts and adopted such innovative tactics, how to use the armored group.

However, the inability of the Soviet military to decisively win the war doomed the army to, that she was "bleeding slowly". The death toll and missing persons in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15 thousand. military, which is a relatively small percentage of 620 thousand., who passed through Afghanistan during the whole war. Sanitary losses are much more indicative, numbering 469 685 human, which together amounts to 73% of the total number of those who returned home. Even more terrifying was the number of military personnel, who became victims of disease (415 932), of which 115 308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31 080 - typhoid fever. In addition to the absolute value of these figures, they talk about Soviet military hygiene and the living conditions of military personnel. According to Grau, these numbers are unheard of in modern armies and modern medicine, and their social impact on soldiers, returnees from Afghanistan, and the Soviet population as a whole should have been huge.

the fire, Pain and Valor of Afghanistan

Swedish military aircraft several hours circling over Petersburg

An equally destructive role, according to Grau, corruption played - big bribes were paid, to avoid being drafted. The children of high-ranking leaders were also diverted by any means from conscription, or at least from being sent to Afghanistan.. OKSV was in the full sense of the workers' and peasants.

Former Afghans, returning home, "Under targeted volleys of libel and lies" found, that they are not considered heroes at all. Afghan experience superimposed on economic, political, social, ethnic and military issues, existed in the USSR, which ultimately led to its disintegration.

OPPONENT'S OPINION

Of particular interest are also Grau's criticisms of the tactical combat examples given in the collection.. To summarize them, you get the following set of criticisms from the point of view of a U.S. Army expert:

- the drill review as a mandatory event before the combat exit gave the Mujahideen information about, that a military operation is being prepared;

- inability to correctly apply reconnaissance units and use dominant heights;

- lack of initiative in action;

- using reconnaissance units not for reconnaissance, but for purely combat missions;

- using the principle “if it’s stupid, but it works, then it's not stupid ": the simple expulsion of the Mujahideen from some territory was of little effect, since they were returning back after the departure of the Soviet troops;

- insufficient air and artillery support, as well as poor radio communication with supporting units;

- a disdainful attitude towards the expulsion of the head, lateral and rear reconnaissance patrols;

- carrying out operations in settlements without taking into account the possible death of the civilian population and damage to property;

- the desire of big bosses to command combat units in operations, to then include yourself in the list of awarded;

- acting with limited forces, the Soviet command hoped to gain time to prepare the Afghan army for the fight against the mujahideen, but it turned out to be impossible;

- Soviet units and units experienced chronic understaffing due to a large percentage of cases (from a quarter to a third of the number of units were out of action due to illness);

- poor military intelligence often led to the loss of surprise in well-prepared actions and operations;

- airborne assault forces often lacked a thorough organization of artillery escort from closed firing positions, as, apparently, the Soviet command experienced a shortage of funds for the transfer of artillery by air;

- it is better to evacuate from the combat zone using the "shrinking ring" method, than a way of gradual withdrawal with successive dispatch of patrols;

- the equipment of Soviet military personnel was too heavy, to ensure maneuverability in the mountains;

- demining was not effective enough due to the, that the mujahideen planted mines in a non-metallic hull;

- during the operation, ground units as part of an armored group and airborne assault forces did not always have stable interaction and communication;

- ammunition consumption was very high, which was facilitated by the design features of the Kalashnikov assault rifle - transfer from the fuse immediately to automatic fire and only then to single shots;

- insufficient shooting accuracy;

- Soviet checkpoints did not provide reliable blocking of the Mujahideen, especially at night, therefore, stripping operations were not very effective;

- non-commissioned officers, recruited, did not provide appropriate discipline and service at checkpoints;

- Mi-24 helicopters performed well in Afghanistan, but the Soviet command could not use them in large numbers due to a lack of maintenance equipment and protected airfields, as well as the increased needs of logistics;

- passive defense instead of, to patrol, active reconnaissance and ambush;

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- the commander often had to personally monitor the performance of subordinates of their duties, to prevent disruption of the combat mission;

- the Soviet command managed to achieve success, when units were hastily put together to carry out a combat mission. It says, one side, about tactical flexibility, on the other hand, apparently, about the absence of the effect of the "general's presence";

- passive actions in ensuring the safety of road traffic instead of the rotation of forces, taking temporary positions and deceiving events and harassing actions - this allowed the Mujahideen to easily bypass checkpoints and concentrate forces there, where they were not expected;

- piles of dry ration cans served as a refuge for rats, spreading the infection, and also unmasked the location of Soviet troops and checkpoints;

- the lack of professional non-commissioned officers led to inadequate preparation for escorting convoys, this led to overwhelming company level commanders, who had to delve into all the little details of combat training;

- the Mujahideen sought primarily to disable the command vehicle in the convoy, which stood out for, that had additional antennas, and thus deprive the commander of the ability to control the battle;

- insufficient attention to laying the route of the movement of convoys on the map with the allocation of bottlenecks and potentially dangerous zones of fire with the subsequent planning of possible actions;

- large losses from the lack of tactical skill of commanders - instead of being drawn into a column in an empty village, it is necessary to conduct reconnaissance with a dismounted train;

the fire, Pain and Valor of Afghanistan

Soviet and Afghan warriors. 1985 year.
Photo © RIA Novosti

- air cover for the movement of the column had to be carried out by rolls from one height to another;

- when conducting convoys, special barriers are not used (road-opening force) and rapid reaction forces, fake convoys are also not used;

- poor planning of escorting convoys without taking into account the actions of air cover on the enemy's withdrawal routes and the lack of planning for interaction with artillery;

- when conducting convoys, the movement of the reconnaissance patrol is tied to the road;

- the actions of commanders when repelling an attack on a convoy are mainly passive-reactive;

- inclusion of personnel in combat groups, recruited from different divisions, which called into question military coordination and mutual assistance on a friendly basis;

- when setting up an ambush, there is no need to unmask yourself, urging the enemy to lay down their arms and surrender, it is unreasonable, because if prisoners are needed, then in any case as a result of an ambush, usually, the enemy has prisoners and wounded;

- careless attitude to stealth in an ambush - scattered cans, cigarette packs, etc., Besides, generally smoking as an unmasking factor, especially taking into account the Soviet "vigorous" tobacco;

- the personal involvement of senior commanders in the preparation of units for combat operations undermined the initiative of junior commanders and weakened control over the actions of subordinates;

- the desire for inclusive control led to the overuse of radio communications, which made it possible for the mujahideen to be aware of the actions of the Soviet troops.

According to Grau, The Soviet Union was unable to achieve a military victory in Afghanistan for the following reasons.

At first, Soviet troops were unable to close the Afghan border with Pakistan and Iran, to interrupt the supply of the mujahideen.

Secondly, The USSR was unable to introduce sufficient forces into the country due to world public opinion (in particular, in third world countries), as well as the inability to provide logistical support to a more powerful contingent.

Thirdly, Afghanistan is a land of strong beliefs and traditions, and the population put up fierce resistance to Soviet troops and hostile communist ideology from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA), since this ideology ran counter to the national, social structure and traditional religion.

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Fourth, the Soviet command assigned secondary roles to the Afghan security forces, considering them exclusively as "cannon fodder". This demoralized and reduced the fighting efficiency of the Afghan troops., and they were able to partially restore their authority only after the departure of the Soviet troops.

Fifth, the Soviet command used indiscriminate artillery shelling and air strikes in rural areas, to force the population to leave and thus interrupt the supply of the Mujahideen.

Finally, the Soviet command did not want to make losses, which were required to achieve complete victory, and therefore replaced the infantry melee with firepower.

THE BACK SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN FROM THE BEAR'S POINT OF VIEW

It is necessary to recognize, that in general, the tactics of the actions of the Mujahideen were quite effective. Soviet troops were opposed by a well-trained and skillful enemy.

During the entire time the OKSV was in Afghanistan, the Soviet command had to solve various tasks.. The main of them were: defeat of the armed formations of the opposition, their base areas and warehouses; expansion and strengthening of state power in the regions; prohibiting the entry of caravans with weapons and rebel detachments from abroad; protection and defense of military and national economic facilities, communications, airfields and military garrisons; routing of transport convoys with cargo. Moreover, to solve the last two tasks, up to 70% available forces and means of the OKSV.

In order to reduce the military activity of the opposition, Soviet and government Afghan troops carried out military operations. According to the methods of action, they were divided into blocking and combing the area.; simultaneous or sequential strikes against opposition formations, located at different depths; ambush; raids; mining of the area; raiding and evasive actions; assault actions (destruction of the enemy in the caves, kyarizakh, villages and fortresses prepared for defense); search and reconnaissance activities; the use of tactical airborne assault forces; artillery fire on precisely reconnoitered rebel targets; independent aviation.

The practice of organizing ambushes has become widespread, which were used mainly to prohibit the replenishment of Mujahideen units with weapons and ammunition from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. A reinforced platoon was usually assigned to an ambush. (company). A special feature was the creation of an armored group from standard equipment, which was located 8-12 km from the ambush site. With the outset of the battle, she rapidly advanced to her unit and supported it with airborne weapons. The success of actions was ensured by ingenuity in organizing an ambush, effective enemy reconnaissance, observance of the secrecy of the advancement and careful camouflage on the ground, skillful creation of a fire bag in combination with the use of mines, clear interaction with the armored group and helicopters, endurance, courage and initiative of personnel.

Beginning with 1981 of the year, the command of the OKSV switched to conducting operations with large forces, which turned out to be much more effective (Operation Ring in Parvan, Panjshir offensive and raids, Operation Magistral in Paktia). The enemy suffered significant losses, nevertheless, it was not possible to completely defeat the detachments of the Mujahideen.

In the course of operations in areas occupied by troops, state authorities were created. However, they did not have real power.. After Soviet or Afghan government troops left the occupied area, their place was again taken by the surviving rebels. They destroyed party activists and restored their influence in the area.. Informants appeared in every village, who followed, how and who grows "hatred of the infidels". Those Afghans, who showed no hostility towards the Russian soldiers, killed by families. As a result, towards the end 1986 the balance was formed: government troops, even supported by OXV, could not inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and force him to stop armed struggle, and the opposition, in its turn, was unable to overthrow the existing regime in the country by force. it became evident, that the Afghan problem can only be solved through negotiations.

AT 1987 year, the leadership of Kabul offered the opposition a policy of national reconciliation. At first, she was successful. Thousands of rebels have ceased fighting. The main efforts of our troops during this period were transferred to the protection and delivery of materiel, coming from the Soviet Union. But the opposition, feeling in the policy of national reconciliation for themselves a serious danger, stepped up subversive activities. Fierce fighting has begun again. This was largely facilitated by the supply of the latest weapons from abroad., including American heavy weapons and the Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

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At the same time, the declared policy opened up prospects for negotiations on the settlement of the Afghan issue.. 14 April 1988 years in Geneva, agreements were signed to end external interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. In accordance with them, Soviet troops in the period before 15 February 1989 years were brought home.

DIFFERENT ATTITUDE

In connection with the announced in 1985 year, the policy of glasnost in the Soviet press began to appear critical articles about Soviet participation in this war. At the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in December 1989 year, a Resolution was adopted on the political assessment of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan - it declared, that the invasion of Afghanistan deserves political and moral condemnation.

Society is divided in its assessment of the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, moreover, among the bulk of the civilian population, a negative attitude prevailed. According to the poll, held in December 1989 of the year (attended by about 15 thousand. human, and half of them passed through Afghanistan), the presence of Soviet servicemen in a neighboring country was assessed as "fulfilling an international duty" 35% of the interviewed "Afghans" and only 10% non-combatants. How was the “discrediting of the concept of“ international debt ”assessed? 19% Afghans and 30% the rest of the respondents. How "our shame" the participation of the USSR in the war was defined only 17% "Afghans" - and 46% other respondents. 17% "Afghans" said: "Proud of it!», while of the rest, such an assessment of events was given only by 6%.

Soviet servicemen fought with dignity in Afghanistan. For courage and bravery, manifested on the land of Afghanistan, 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Over 200 thousand. soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. Most of them are 18–20-year-old boys.

After the withdrawal of the OCSV, hostilities between government forces and the mujahideen units continued until 1992 of the year, when opposition parties came to power in Afghanistan. However, peace never came to this war-torn land.. An armed struggle for power and spheres of influence has now erupted between parties and opposition leaders. Intertwining with national, religious, economic and other contradictions, she was fierce and irreconcilable. The worst thing was, what has been achieved in 1987 year, the agreement between Gorbachev and Reagan on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan meant the automatic extermination of a huge number of local residents, supporting secular (and not at all Soviet!) transformations.

It should also be said, that the USSR was not at all a classical aggressor, how they still try to imagine him. In the period 1980-1988 in the country with the help of "shuravi" was built and put into operation 65 large socio-economic facilities. During the years of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, literacy mastered 45% men and 15% women, despite the fact that before that there was total illiteracy in the country: among women - 96,3%, in men - about 90,5%. The standard of living in this country during the period of the Soviet military presence was one of the highest in its entire history.. Public transport was well developed in Kabul, trolleybuses were running!

Our troops provided large-scale material and medical assistance to Afghans, participated in the delivery of goods to the most remote provinces of the country, repair of roads and bridges, other construction works. Appeals of local residents to the command of the Soviet troops with requests for help have become everyday. Another thing, what, Unfortunately, most of our citizens, although they were qualified specialists, had a bad idea of ​​the situation, established in the country, could not take into account the rapidly changing situation and, accordingly, provide adequate advisory assistance, often relying on a purely humanitarian aspect of it.

And the slogan “All to fight the infidels!»Worked. Children also began to shoot at Soviet soldiers, and old people. At the same time, terrorist groups began to grow by leaps and bounds, professing radical views and ready to return order to the country, characteristic of the era of the tribal community and early feudalism. Brzezinski's "great idea" resulted in, that uncontrolled groups motivated by religious fanaticism have killed hundreds of thousands of Afghans. Past 30 have shown, that the US secret war against Soviet internationalist warriors turned out to be a "bad idea". In the last ten years alone, people have died in Afghanistan 41 thousand. human. Of them 7,5% - women, 17,9% - children.

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Was the decision to send troops to Afghanistan a mistake?? Now many people still say: "Yes!"But the paradox is, what if in Poland, for the liberation of which they gave life from above 600 thousand. Soviet soldiers, now they are demolishing monuments, established once in their honor, then in Afghanistan everything happens exactly the opposite - memorial plaques are installed at the sites of past battles. And ordinary Afghans say: "You fought bravely, you killed us, we killed you, and then you sat down with us at the same table and drank vodka. You never disdained us. When I approach an American here, in Afghanistan, The first thing he does is point a machine gun at me. He's afraid of me, and despises. He will never drink with me or share bread with me. Because I am the lowest being to him. And the Russian was a brother. Even when he killed ".

Memories of Afghans are more and more reminiscent of not so much the armed confrontation, how many facts of construction with the help of the Soviet Union of roads, factories, plants, power, schools in this country.

And we have a lot of those, who returned from that war not only with crippled souls, but also with inverted destinies. But our people honor the feat of those, who followed the state order, risking your life and health. This war is our pain, our valor and our tragedy. Annually 15 February is the day of remembrance of those, who gave his military duty, did not take the oath. And on this day we speak again: "Vivat to you all, our dear "Soviet"!»

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