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Tripwire - troubled Russian hitman "Poseidon"

Tripwire – bad Russian hitman «Poseidon»

Mindful of the negative consequences of the torpedo crisis of the first half of the Second World, It has a weight to malfunctions and faulty torpedo moves (consequently saving on tests in the late 1920's - early 1930's), after the US Navy War rigidly posed the question about the need to test all the new torpedoes and countermeasures to them.

As a result, since the beginning of the 50s carried out large-scale fleet, by our standards, a series of tests and research exercises using practical torpedoes - up to the hit to the body of conventional submarines (eg, at 1959 year - up to 6-7 attacks by torpedoes Mk37 and Mk44 and hits per day (!) on the submarine "Albacore") - and countermeasures.

It is on the basis of the teachings of the US Navy command had decided to stop the construction of diesel-powered submarines (PL). Besides, Americans have developed effective tactics "duels" nuclear submarines (PLA), providing deviation even when a sudden attack first of our submarine and "gap distance", followed by execution of our submarine at a safe distance for remote-controlled submarines torpedoes. A key role in this process belonged to the means of sonar countermeasures (SGPD), factor which adversary raised even higher low noise factor submarine.

TORPEDO TO COMBAT Torpedo

Along with the GSPC since the beginning of the 60s the US Navy carried out the work on the active agent torpedo protection, ensuring the destruction of the attacking torpedoes. Declassified materials show US Navy, that in the 60 years they have some very interesting results were obtained, but insufficient technological level of the time, and most importantly - highly effective against the GSPC first generations of torpedoes before the start of the 90s did not require such a complex in the creation of remedies, how antitorpeda.

The situation changed dramatically with the advent of efficient classifiers GSPC and especially with the transition homing systems (CCH) torpedoes in the fully digital processing, that has allowed to drastically reduce the level of "side lobes" and increase the immunity of the GSPC. A further factor was Soviet anti torpedoes, having guidance channel on the wake target, against which GSPC had limited effectiveness. Despite the fact that the US Navy had developed a number of effective ways to counter (complex torpedo zigzags et al.), the problem of protection against them have not gone anywhere. Especially - in the case of dalnohodnyh torpedoes caliber 65 cm.

The first approach to the issue of equipping antitorpedami US Navy ship was an attempt to modernize the serial torpedoes Mk46 Mk46 Mod.7 in option. planned upgrade 172 torpedo, but in the mid-90s the program was closed due to "lack of satisfactory test results". The question was not only and not so much in antitorpede, but in the complex issues of detection - destruction - destruction of attacking torpedoes. An attempt to solve it by rapid alterations "on the knee» Mk46 failed. However, it is worth noting the intensity and scope of the tests in the United States Navy, even in this unfortunate series was held over 30 sea ​​trials antitorped.

NEW STAGE

In the late 90-ies of the centers of surface and submarine warfare, the US Navy and the Laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania has been deployed a large-scale program to create new means of torpedo protection in order to preserve the benefits of the submarine and US Navy ships over the enemy and solve a number of new tasks. A limited amount of article does not allow to describe all the vicissitudes of American developers (especially since the open materials, obviously, seriously censored), it is therefore appropriate to identify key moments and events program, which, apparently, It was not easy.

In the first comprehensive publication on the subject, published in 2007 year and dedicated to testing topside modifications of complex Torpedo Defense System (TDS) AN / WSQ-11 antitorpedami Tripwire aboard the amphibious assault ship "Cleveland" (from 2006 of the year), developers clearly were felt emotions. So, development manager Bock said: “This is a resounding success! We plan to achieve initial operational readiness ... in 2012 financial year ". Then he led the modernization program of four SSBNs type "Ohio" in the version of the special purpose vehicle and cruise missiles, as well as the head of the program AN / WSQ-11 / Tripwire / SSTD he was replaced by Mr. Howard.

Interesting is the question of financing of works on the subject. These documents Navy and Congress figures raise a number of questions and, apparently, significantly below actual. In one of the publications I had a phrase: "Bock declined to discuss funding for antitorpedy".

Tripwire – bad Russian hitman «Poseidon»

Despite a number of "commercial" solutions, embedded in antitorpedu (eg, electronic sensor fuse with the price of the order 400 dollars), obviously, that the development was a very costly, and the key issue here - antitorpedy power plant and the high cost of its mining (and the whole complex AN / WSQ-11 / SSTD too).

The main feature of the Tripwire anti-torpedo and the ultra-small torpedo based on it is the use of a powerful deep-water power plant with a Rankine closed-cycle turbine, where energy is obtained by the reaction of lithium and sulfur hexafluoride. For the first time, data on such a power plant were described in a US patent in 1962 year (and further 1965 and 1967 years). In the series, this installation was introduced by the US Navy in the small-sized torpedo Mk50.

Key benefits of the power plant - the lack of power, depending on the depth and very high power density (a pair of energy intensity of the lithium - sulfur hexafluoride 4 times the energy consumption of conventional torpedo unitary fuel OTTO-2).

Similar developments - with a closed-cycle turbine - were carried out in the USSR., but the creation of "Tapir" torpedo with it because of a number of technical and organizational problems have been terminated 1987 It was in favor of "Physics" with power plant on the monopropellant. According to the author, the key is our mistake for "Tapir" was performed in 1976 year, when it became apparent, that successful experiments checkers small-diameter slow-burning fuels with high energy technology can not be repeated on a large diameter checker (to torpedo caliber 53 cm). The developer was forced to move to the "multilateral" scheme, fast-fuel. Unfortunately, the possibility of creating a small caliber torpedoes with slow-burning fuel we have not seen, which is a pity - with PRS APR-2 torpedo could she for a long time to be the best small-sized torpedo in the world ...

In the US, small-sized torpedo Mk50 has been successfully created, admitted to the Navy ammunition, but in the late 1990s - early 2000s, it was taken out of ammunition and operation due to the high cost of the practice torpedo firing it.

In anti-torpedo, the most complex power plant Mk50 (caliber 32 cm) was housed in an extremely small diameter housing (17 cm). The obvious conclusion from this - the presence of the US Navy's stringent requirements for developers to ensure the destruction of high-speed objects at greater depths along with conventional torpedoes, applied at depths of up to several hundred meters. Version about, that such a choice of the power plant was "just a mistake of the developers", uncertain, because at the same time, the US Navy sent Mk50 torpedoes warehouses (operating cost!), so, to use expensive and complex power generation in a new design (and requiring large statistical tests), We must have been very good reasons. Especially given that the result could well be produced on conventional fuels. Most likely, the reason was the requirements for the depth of application. (targeted goals) - more than a kilometer. Moreover, the depth requirements were so strict, that developers were forced to make a very difficult decision to limit the diameter of the housing and the choice is extremely unfavorable for maneuverability antitorpedy ratio length / diameter.

Of interest is a comparison of the weight and dimensional characteristics of several types antitorped (cm. Table.).

obviously, Tripwire that mass is close to that of SeaSpider (cm. "European fiasco" sea spider ", «HBO» from 31.01.19), however, in contrast to the serious problems of the latter, the American torpedo was successfully tested and adopted by the Navy due to its powerful power plant, almost an order of magnitude superior to a simple solid-propellant rocket motor at SeaSpider. However obvious much higher maneuverability SeaSpider - due to the optimal ratio length / diameter, which, but, Limited applicability to great depths, because it requires a significant increase in thickness and weight of the housing and addressing efficiency light warhead rugged. With this in mind, the Canadian Navy for himself made a choice in favor of development in cooperation with the German project SeaSpider, rather than purchase in the US Tripwire.

Tripwire data on speed are not given, but they can be considered as 60 knots or more, which ensures the destruction of targets at speeds of up to 100-120 knots, subject to accurate target designation and anti-torpedo output from acute heading angles of the target, and the range can be estimated at 2-3 km.

This issue must be emphasized particularly, as the maneuverability requirements for torpedoes at the American developers have traditionally been very harsh (in domestic special publications called them "exaggerated"), but in the case of Tripwire is an obvious exchange 'maneuverability in depth ". Moreover, with high probability significantly greater than that for torpedoes Mk50 (just over a kilometer).

Furthermore, this feature Tripwire greatly limits the likelihood of defeat conventional torpedoes, and on this indicator loses Tripwire uniquely has formally lower TTX antitorpede M15E national complex "Bag-E". The bottom line is, that guidance antitorpedy important distance to the target, ie sonar, and here the limiting factor is the physics - the speed of sound in water. Taking into account the capture range of the attacking torpedo (no more 300 m taking into account the dimensions of the Tripwire antenna) to correct guidance errors and ensure the defeat of a high-speed small-sized object with a low-weight warhead, there is an extremely limited number of cycles "sonar sending - echo reception - guidance correction", here and maneuverability for antitorpedy crucial.

A particularly acute problem in the surface layer, which is why in addition to Tripwire US Navy is working hard to supercavitating projectiles, that is the most difficult to antitorped layer 10-25 m trying to close the artillery (!).

Note, that the US Navy already had a developed program for the creation of deep-sea combat assets and submarines. Furthermore, until the early 70s, they were significantly ahead of us (eg, research shooting in 1969 year model sample special deep submarine torpedo towing "Dolphin" with its output to a depth considerably 1 km). The Vietnam War led to a serious redistribution of funds in the US Armed Forces, and deep-sea Navy plans have gone under "Financial knife". But the new conditions raised the issue of combat special deep-sea weapons harshly.

The initial features of the SSTD complex include high requirements for the number of attacking torpedoes (no less 4) and integration of means of detection - suppression (distractions) - destruction. At the same time, conventional towed torpedo traps had to be supplemented with fired drifting and self-propelled jamming devices. However, in the development process, self-propelled devices were "lost", and the effectiveness of drifting and towed against modern torpedoes is deliberately insufficient.

In addition to surface carriers, the use of anti-torpedoes and ultra-small torpedoes Tripwire in the US Navy was supposed to be from underwater (including autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles) and aviation carriers. At the same time, standard outboard launchers CSA-1 were planned for placement on submarines. (16 pieces on modernized submarines of the "Los Angeles" type and 14 - on the new "Virginias"). A comparison with domestic nuclear-powered ships is appropriate here.. On the leaflet of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the Borey-A project, presented at the forum "Army-2015", in the ammunition load of the project 955A missile carrier it was announced 6 antitorped «Lasta». obviously, that it is extremely small and can provide protection only from 1-2 enemy attacks. The ammunition load of our submarines' anti-torpedoes needs to be increased, and they should be on all our submarines.

DRAMA TEST

Subsequent work on the SSTD was greatly influenced by the torpedoing of the Cheonan corvette by the North Korean submarine of the South Korean Navy in March 2010 of the year. 5th U.S. Fleet Command, whose area of ​​responsibility includes the Gulf and Indian Ocean region, demanded emergency equipping with PTZ complexes of its most valuable ships - aircraft carriers. And if initially the priority of equipping the SSTD was to belong to the "escort", this is a new decision on the priority installation of SSTDs on aircraft carriers due to the specifics of the protected object, high level of interference and failure in 2011 year with the development of an active target designation sonar put the developers in extremely difficult conditions.

The first anti-torpedo firing from the aircraft carrier "George Bush" was carried out on May 15-19 2013 of the year, and in November 2013 years - repeated. At the same time, they were used as anti-torpedoes with a standard powerful thermal power plant, and its "electric version" (the appropriateness of the use of which is in great doubt).

However, initial optimistic evaluations of SSTD performance from test results, conducted in extremely "preferential" conditions, by the beginning 2014 years have changed to critical (plus it was officially announced that it would not purchase anti-torpedoes for the period up to 2016 of the year). The following problematic issues were identified: the real effectiveness of a small warhead of an anti-torpedo in actual use, taking into account its insufficient maneuverability; high level of interference from the carrier and its escort ships and problems due to this with the detection of low-noise torpedoes in passive mode; problems with active towed target designation sonar; mismatch of target simulators with actual attack torpedoes (as in the part of work in the near-surface layer, and in terms of noise).

The main thing of all this is the obvious problems with the defeat of torpedoes in the near-surface layer due to the insufficient maneuverability of the anti-torpedo and the power of its warhead.. It should be noted, what, despite the fact that these problems were noted in reports back in 2013-2014, until the very last moment, the US Navy and developers actually shied away from conducting objective tests. And for military service 2014 of the year "George Bush" left with a virtually incapacitated SSTD and only passive target designation, knowingly did not ensure the effective use of anti-torpedo.

Meanwhile, SSTD trials continued., in summer 2014 years, the first firing was carried out with the provision of simultaneous guidance of two anti-torpedoes at one target, investigated the issues of their detection in difficult conditions. And in the end 2014 year began sea trials of a new active target designation station. However, problems with its technical reliability were not resolved until very recently..

At the end 2014 of the year SSTD half-pack (full option - 4 launchers on 6 anti-torpedo each) and with an active target designation station (in addition to passive) was installed on the aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt". Moreover, during the tests at the end 2014 years since it used only "electric" anti-torpedoes for practical shooting, who in no way could check the real performance and efficiency of the complex. For combat service 2015 of the year this aircraft carrier also left with an inoperative SSTD complex.

Taking into account the problems of SSTD on "Theodore Roosevelt" for the third aircraft carrier, Dwight Eisenhower, SSTD was installed in "initial configuration" (without active target designation station), similar to aircraft carrier "George W. Bush". Taking into account the questionable effectiveness of the complex and problems with the reliability of the crews of aircraft carriers, towed hydroacoustic torpedo detection stations were rarely used., and the necessary statistics of their application was not obtained.

BOMB IN CONGRESS

According to test results 2015 of the year, the US Navy postponed the reception of the SSTD complex with 2018 on 2022 year. At the same time, there was "significant progress", especially in terms of detecting torpedoes, but with "well trained operators". Success in working out the anti-torpedo itself, obviously, It was, but again - without checking real conditions and shallow depths (at the same time, test statistics were traditionally high for the US Navy, eg, only in July 2016 of the year - 11 anti-torpedo launches).

Note, that there is a possibility, that the task of conducting tests in such conditions was set, but just at this time, during the tests, the failures of anti-torpedoes and torpedo targets sharply increased. Despite the fact that phrases like “the contractor's tests showed, that the detection system meets the technical requirements of the Navy ". That is, the complex is actually incapable of combat., but the "technical requirements" of the US Navy, its detection system "meets". obviously, that this is a response to serious conflicts between developers and the US Navy (especially since with 2016 years, the US Navy began to "cut funding" on the topic).

just to 2018 a year, virtually incapacitated SSTD complexes managed to receive five US Navy aircraft carriers.

"Pulled" already in the US Congress: “Emerging issues and tensions in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region highlight the continuing need for surface ship torpedo defense capabilities. (SSTD). The committee understands, that the Navy has highlighted this requirement in the Urgent Operational Needs Statement 2010 years and that since then potential regional adversaries have continued to improve their submarines and torpedo. Despite the growing threat ... the budget request and program for future years is inadequate ... and cancels the further development of this SSTD capability. The Committee is concerned about, that this decision is based on the need to balance several years of underfunding across a range of priority areas and that these fiscal dynamics are driving decisions, which endanger the combat readiness and security of the United States. The House Armed Services Committee instructs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a "Torpedo Threat Assessment, plans to develop adequate protective equipment, their characteristics and description, evaluation of their development program in relation to each of the elements ". In the light of these considerations, the committee appoints 1 October 2018 year of hearing on the topic ".

The result of all these showdowns was the confirmation of the Navy's decision to suspend work on the SSTD complex with the dismantling of the already installed complexes.. At the same time it was indicated: detection subsystem has demonstrated "some ability" to detect torpedoes, but its effectiveness and the likelihood of false alarms are unknown; anti-torpedo has demonstrated "some ability" to hit an attacking torpedo, however has "unknown reliability", and its effectiveness in hitting targets "has not yet been tested".

A typical phrase at the end of the document: "Recommendations: absent ".

Decision, certainly, very emotional and caused as scandalousness, and the severity and importance of the question, and it, probably, will still be revised precisely from the angle of carrying out really effective development of anti-torpedo protection, including using the positive part of the backlog of the SSTD program. It should be noted, that deep-sea Tripwire had problems not hitting targets "at all", namely shallow and maneuverable, which was directly related to its deep water.

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

What is the main reason for this failure of the US Navy, despite the fact that huge and high-tech resources were spent and experienced and competent developers were attracted, but the task is difficult, but solvable? The obvious reason is leadership. Success of fundamentally new, breakthrough programs are largely determined by the personality of their leader. In the creation of anti-torpedoes, an unconditional priority belongs to domestic developers. AT 1998 year, as a result of research and development work carried out since the end of the 80s, for the first time in the world, tests of prototypes of domestic anti-torpedoes were crowned with complete success (GNPP "Region", currently - as part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation). The key reason for the success of creating a Russian anti-torpedo in the harsh 90s is not only in its strong and courageous developers, but also in the head - chief designer and general director of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" E.S. Shahidjanov.

Errors in this work were (not wrong one, who do nothing), and it was not easy. But from the very first steps of development, the most critical components of the promising complex and anti-torpedoes were actually tested in difficult sea conditions. (it was 1998 year!). That is the, that the US Navy was simply afraid to spend all the last years, despite pressure from Congress, "Shahidzhanov's team" carried out immediately - at the initial stage of development. Here it should be noted competent and resolute stand of the customer - the then Head of the anti-Navy Rear Admiral VN. Panferova, not only the beginning of this breakthrough development in the extremely harsh conditions 90s, but also to ensure its organizational "research phase", which allowed the developer to carry out the necessary research studies and testing of prototypes, convincingly prove the reality of the work, check the key decisions. The problem is, that we repeated the next time only ... 2013 year. Antitorped we frankly scared.

obviously, In the United States for this development was not found "Shahidzhanova his" and "her Panferova". However, given the extremely tight asking questions torpedo protection and no less strict control of Congress in the necessary organizational measures will be taken in the US, and in the early 2020s effective PTZ complexes, equipped with anti-torpedoes, the US Navy will still enter service. But with a high probability we can say, that it will no longer be AT Tripwire, and products, optimized for effective destruction of conventional torpedoes.

The perspective of Tripwire itself as an anti-torpedo (or midget torpedo) will directly depend on the development of deep-sea combat means United States opponents. Technological groundwork for this in the course of the program is created.

In this way, SSTD program can be estimated as a total failure in terms of the development work, but very serious scientific and technical potential as a research due to the large amount of research and testing. And the main lesson - a "role identity" in engineering and implementing large-scale breakthrough projects, for which it is the presence of his "Korolev" it is the key for success.

Maxim Klimov

Published: lentok Source

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