Why and how the tanks were T-64, T-72 and T- 80. Part 2

continuing History of the formation of the T-64, It should be noted, that this path was bumpy with unexpected twists. At the end 1961 It has been developed and protected TEHPROEKT object 432, and in September 1962 , the first prototypes of the tank samples. In October 1962 , the tank was demonstrated by the heads of state at the Kubinka. Compared to other tanks, it is very different, and, despite the mixed reaction military, its further development was approved.

Externally, the tank looked very impressive, as a exquisitely dressed woman with good looks. I was told, as the first tank when considering options Morozov with his hand held to the line drawing and cut the protruding ends of the first fuel tanks on the shelves nadgusenichnyh. According to Co, that the tank should be all nice.

On the Malyshev plant has produced a pilot batch of tanks for a presentation on state tests. The car was fundamentally new in almost everything and in the process of production tests revealed a large number of defects and shortcomings of the engine and its systems, loading mechanism and a chassis. For this reason, a number of tactical and technical requirements have not been met.

After working and finishing of the construction and removal of comments tank is still in 1963 he was presented to the state tests. However, these measures were not enough, TTT were not fulfilled and the tank was not fully tested and adopted was not accepted.

Despite this, a decision is made to launch it in 1964 year in series production documentation Chief Designer. Tanks sent troops to the accelerated operation, defects detected and eliminated. The design is finalized and in October 1966 the year he was introduced to re-state tests. Successfully completed them in December 1966 It has been adopted by the.

Immediately it should be noted, that mass production of tanks began against the will of the military, and it's natural does not make them supporters of this car. In addition, the military opposed the introduction of a radically new car in the army, as it required major changes in the technical and organizational support of armored forces.

AT 1964 , the T-64 tank was deep modernization. It was set-caliber gun 125 mm and refined many of the tank system. He successfully passed the military tests in May 1968 It was adopted for service as a tank T-64A.

It was a new generation tank, very seriously differed from all previous.
He was too new for its time, and any innovation requires effort and time for finishing. Advantages and disadvantages of the T-64 has been described and discussed in detail. But some wanted to stay.

Their personal impressions of the tank. I was trained on tanks T-55 and once in practice tank repair factory I was able to get into the then-secret T-64. I was struck by two things - the gunner's sight and loading mechanism.

The sight TPD-2-49 It seemed to perfection, how it differed from the unpretentious sight on the "fifty-fifth" and hit their "no tank" performance and characteristics. Then I did not know, that years later I would have to lead the development of sophisticated sighting systems perspective tank.

also struck dosыlately MH. Everything worked so fast, I could not understand, both of the two flexible chains obtained rigid rod. Much later, I ran into Morozova invention, which is not so easy to solve a simple problem.

The most problematic of the tank were three knots - Engine, loading and running gear. If you look at the T-64, T-72 and T-80, they precisely these nodes and different from each other. Everything else they have almost the same - layout, rifle, weaponry, sights, electronics. Not an expert it is difficult to discern.

Engine T-64 caused the most problems, and work on his finishing lasted a very long time. It was created from scratch, there was no technology, no experience in the development of these engines. In the course of its operational development there is a lot of problems and their solutions have to involve experts on metals, ceramics, oil. Conduct research on piston dynamics and seek sometimes by trial and error necessary decisions.

The main engine Charomsky designer designed it and get acceptable results on samples of experienced engine. During the work capacity 580 HP. It was not enough and had to develop a new engine on 5TDF 700 HP. When existing problems it imposes new and many impression, that it can not bring.

Besides Charomsky did not want to engage in fine-tuning the engine, at 1959 the year he retired and returned to Moscow. Instead, he became the chief designer Golinets, a passionate lover of women, it was no longer the chief designer and a completely different level. Under his leadership, the work on the engine is seriously slowed down.

When in 1973 he was adopted by the T-72, furious Morozov, returning from Moscow, He accused of failures Golintsa and very quickly for the "moral decay", he was removed from office.

In spite of all these problems is still the engine has been brought, and the development of the tank "Boxer" is already used by a modification of engine power 1200 HP. Problems were solved, but the time it took and the tank could not get on their feet.

Arose and unexpected problems. As I was told, at the beginning of the military operation of the tank one unit stationed in the coniferous forest, and after a while the tanks began to fail. It revealed, that pine needles clog the ejection cooling system with all its consequences. I had to quickly design and refine the mesh roof administered MTO, and all the tanks from the army to return to the plant and modify.

Why is the T-72 has a new automatic loader? Selecting the Ministry of Health determined ammunition. In early development, he has been a unitary. As a result, we made and made it a separate part of the combustible sleeve and tray. Been looking version of his placement in mechanized laying. At one of the meetings, someone suggested to place it as a bent arm at the elbow. So there was a cabin type MZ.

By adopting this limited version of the emergency evacuation of the driver. The problem was solved, making a hole in the cockpit. But this was only possible with the position "of course" gun. There was also a problem with tray trap, at his departure at a high speed from the gun were cases neulavlivaniya tray and constantly broke the sensor, fixing it in a trap, that led to stop charging process. This problem has also been solved as a result of.

Under these pretexts military did not perceive MH. The T-72 entered a primitive, They threw six shots and put bombs and shells at each other in the pipeline. Trap all they have done nothing. The pallet is simply thrown out. And this despite the fact, that TTM tank should not fight depressurized. In those times seriously to make demands of warfare under conditions of use of nuclear weapons.

The military turned a blind eye to the reduction of ammunition with 28 to 22 and depressurization of the tank while shooting. The main thing to be proved, that the Ministry of Health will not do.

Problems with running. Over the years there have been a lot of debate, What better chassis, and what is worse. I can say straight away, that it was the main criterion when selecting the type of weight suspension in T-64. we must not forget, that TTM weight of the tank should not exceed 34 ton, and from the beginning there were problems with the engine, its capacity was insufficient. Therefore Morozov, knowing what to flotation tank, chose this option and running all the time, it defended.

This type of suspension were natural disadvantages, they were treated, but the weight of the demand strictly observed. Constantly getting up dilemma between the characteristics and the weight, since the adoption of the other way increased the weight of the tank to two tons. The T-72 and T-80 did it, T-64 left lightweight chassis. Of course, such restrictions on weight and size it was difficult to achieve the satisfaction of all claims, but the main thought, that this must be reconciled. Kostenko, in his book mentions, Morozov agreed that in communion with him, that he was wrong apparently, but that is history.

So there are three types of chassis: Kharkov, Tagil and Leningrad. many tests were conducted, by their results still proved to be the most effective Leningrad chassis. In KMDB it is also taken as a basis in subsequent modifications of tanks and the development of "Boxer" promising tank.

Solving these problems will require time and since the start of the tank design to adopting passed 11 years. During this time there were both supporters, and opponents of the tank design. The reasons here were the technical, organizational and market. The tank was a new generation and debugging applications naturally demanded a lot of effort.

Military on the one hand want to get a new tank uprated, with another, alarming tank their complexity and inevitable when introducing changes to the structure of tank and forces preparation tank. It has imposed technical problem and they delayed the adoption of the tank into service.

Besides they were dissatisfied starting tank T-64 into production without a complete gosistpytany 1964 year and considered, that they impose on the tank. The commander of the tank troops Marshal Poluboyarov and then Marshal Babajanyan, HBTU bosses and the landfill at Kubinka eventually began to gravitate toward more simple version of the tank, how it is presented to T-72.

The guide saw the defense industry, what a tremendous amount of work to be done in the organization of production of this tank. Persistent problems with the organization of production, especially new engine, also we did not cause them much enthusiasm. Only iron will "of the Stalinist People's Commissar" Ustinov, to bet on the T-64 as a single tank for the army, It made everyone realize tasks.

There were also tactical reasons. The launch mass production of a single tank and ZKZ UVZ obliged to conduct its development on this basis. Naturally, they no pleasure from this test, through their lobbyists in the military environment, Industry executives and government sought to prevent this and to promote their projects tanks.

In August 1967 It issued a decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of equipping the army with new tanks T-64 and the development of capacities for their production. The release of this tank had to be carried out at three plants - in Kharkov, Nizhny Tagil and Leningrad. Given the limited capacity to produce engines 5TDF, setting it in peacetime it was provided to all plants, and in particular period UVZ should produce a "reserve" variant T-64 based on the existing engine B-2.

Such KMDB tank developed embodiment (an object 439). AT 1967 They were manufactured and tested by experienced tank samples and successfully tested. Technical documentation on the tank was transferred to the Uralvagonzavod for serial production.

In parallel on LB from the beginning of the 60s were working on installation on tank T-64 turbomachine (T-64T). Were made and tested specimens of the tank. In October 1968 , it was decided to create a T-64 GTE (an object 219). This work is of little interest, acceptable because the turbine has not been.

Regardless of the decisions made at the Uralvagonzavod and LB on the basis of the T-64 were carried out work on creating their own versions of future tanks. At this stage, with serious support military began lobbying the Uralvagonzavod project (an object 172), who later became a tank T-72. As Kostenko wrote in his book, the process of formation of this tank was a long, thorny and wore almost detective character. It was really a detective story - with forgery of public documents!

To be continued…

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